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This thesis investigates the evolution and implementa-
tion of Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109,
"Major System Acquisition." The presentation begins with
background material illustrating the evolution of acquisi-
tion principles incorporated in Circular A-109, particularly
the recommendations contained in the Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement. The policies of Circular A-109 to be fol-
lowed by executive branch agencies in the acquisition of
Major Systems are analyzed in detail as to content and inter-
pre tat ion
.
Three areas of major change to the Department of Defense
and the Department of the Navy acquisition policies and pro-
cedures as a result of the implementation of Circular A-109
are presented. The Navy's Shipboard Intermediate Range Com-
bat System Program is examined as one of the first full-
scale attempts to implement the Circular A-109 policies.
Lessons learned from the initial implementation of Circular
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For two decades prior to the issuance in April 1976 of
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109, (Circular
A-109), titled, "Major Systems Acquisition" [ Re f . 1], re-
forms to reduce cost overruns and to diminish the controver-
sy over Federal Government resource allocation were called
for from both public and private sectors. Finally, in Novem-
ber 1969, the Commission on Government Procurement (COGP)
was created by Congress to study and recommend to Congress
methods "to promote the economy, efficiency and effective-
ness of Federal procurement by the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government" [Ref. 2]. After three years of investi-
gation and analysis, COGP issued a five volume report set-
ting in motion profound and needed change to government pro-
curement processes.
As a result of one of the recommendaticns of the COGP,
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) was estab-
lished within the Office of Management and 3udget (OMB)
.
OFPP is charged with establishing procurement policies across
all executive branch agencies of the Federal Government.
One of the first outputs of OFPP was Circular A-109 in April
1976, culminating nearly a two-year joint Administration and
Congressional effort to establish policy guidelines appli-





Circular A-109 is a landmark document which adds several
new dimensions to the business of defining and funding major
systems in the fulfillment of basic agency roles and mis-
sions. Circular A-109 provides guidance for the establish-
ment of a common framework for acquisition policy formula-
tion and program implementation to all Executive Agencies.
The COGP recommendations concerning major system acquisition
which are incorporated in Circular A-109 are not basically
new or startling. What is different in Circular A-109 is
the integrated framework which unifies the formulation of
needs with program implementation and the direction of Agen-
cy mission needs and goals.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been designated as
the lead Executive Agency to implement Circular A-109 [Ref.
3]. DOD has responded with revisions to its major system
acquisition directives, resulting in major policy changes.
The three service components of DOD are in the process
of revising the individual directives and instructions to
comply with these new DOD directives. Several DOD programs
in the early formulation and development phases are already
implementing the new A-109 acquisition policies. A Navy
project, the Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System
(3IRCS), initiated in May 1975, was directed by the Secre-
tary of the Navy (SECNAV) in December 1975 to implement COGP
recommendations
.
Thus, SIRCS was already following an acquisition strategy
that was consistent with the policy guidance of Circular A-
109 at time of its introduction in April 1976.
15

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the evolu-
tion and implementation of OMB Circular A-109. The presenta-
tion of this thesis begins with background material illustrat-
ing the evolution of acquisition principles incorporated in
Circular A-109o Next, Circular A-109 is analyzed in detail
as to content and interpretation. Department of Defense and
Department of the Navy implementation of Circular A-109 is
investigated. Then, a Department of the Navy program, the
Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System, is examined as
one of the first full-scale attempts to implement the Circu-
lar A-109 policies. Finally, some general conclusions in the
form of lessons learned regarding Circular A-109 implementa-
tion are presented.
C. CONTENT
In the Section II, the economic rationale of government
resource allocation leading to the issuance of Circular A-
109 is covered along with a brief history of major system
acquisition. The Congressional mandates for procurement re-
forms leading to the establishment of the Commission on Gov-
ernment Procurement and the Executive Branch implementation
of these reforms through the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy are analyzed. This section also examines the Commis-
sion on Government Procurement. Of the 147 COGP recommenda-
tions, the 12 recommendations involving major system acquisi-
tion which led to the establishment of OFPP and the issuance
of Circular A-109 are also examined.
16

In Section III a detailed analysis of the actual content
of Circular A-109 is presented. OFPP Pamphlet No. 1 [Ref, 4]
is used to illustrate executive agency implementation. Cir-
cular A-109 and its relationships with the Congressional Bud-
get and Impoundment Act of 1974, mission area budgeting and
zero-based budgeting are analyzed. Finally, this section
presents some inherent problems associated with the imple-
mentation of Circular A-109.
In Section IV, the recently revised Department of Defense
Directives 5000.1, 5000.2 and 5000,30 [Refs. 5, 6, 7] issued
in compliance with Circular A-109, are examined, The prin-
cipal changes to the DOD major system acquisition process
are analyzed, in particular, the changes to the front-end of
the system acquisition life cycle. In addition, principal
changes to DOD organization; the recently created Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD) billet, Defense Acquisition Execu-
tive, and the decentralization in decision making are dis-
cussed. DOD's submission of its implementation plan to Of-
fice of Management and Budget (0MB) is covered. The DOD
components preparation of internal policies and procedures
as well as DOD's Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) and
Milestone procedures are investigated. Finally, in this
section, Congressional interest in DOD implementation is ex-
plored .
In Section VI, the SIRCS program is introduced as one of
the first DOD programs to implement Circular A-109, and the
SIRCS acquisition strategy and structure is examined. The
evolution of the SIRCS program is presented, first under the
17

COGP recommendations, and subsequently also under Circular
A-109 directives to present date, highlighting both legisla-
tive and DOD influences, The continued operation of the
SIRCS program under Circular A-109 directives for the forth-
coming Validation and Full Scale Development Phases of the
life cycle is postulated. This section also compares the
applicable COGP recommendations and the SIRCS program acqui-
sition strategy. The section concludes with an investigation
of some of the inherent implementation problems of Circular
A-109 incurred by the SIRCS program and with a discussion of
the critical requirements involved in the competitive concept
formulation currently being conducted by the SIRCS program.
In Section VII, the constructive improvements of Circu-
lar A-109 in major system acquisition strategy and the ad-
vantages of Circular A-109 principles applied to future pro-
gram management is discussed.
D. iMETHOD OF RESEARCH
Because the issuance of Circular A-109 and the resulting
revision of DOD Directives incorporating Circular A-109 have
only recently occurred, little documentation pertaining to
DOD and Navy implementation was available as research mate-
rial for this thesis. As a result, emphasis in data gather-
ing in this area was placed on personal interviews and dis-
cussions with various participants knowledgeable in Circular
A-109 and its implementation and on attendance at various
conferences and seminars at which new developments in feder-
al acquisition policy were discussed,
IS

One of the major inputs into the thesis came from two
weeks of intensive interviews in the Washington, D.C. area
in June and September 1977. These interviews were held with
people who were intimately involved in implementing Circular
A-109 policies. The sessions ranged from 30 minutes to
three hours with some interviewees being revisited for addi-
tional detail and update on the evolving implementation. In-
terviews were conducted with particular emphasis given to
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Deputy
Director for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense;
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, OP-05; Naval Mate-
rial Command; Office of Commander, Naval Air Systems Command,
and the Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System, PMS-404-
40. A listing of persons and organizations interviewed is
given in Appendix A.
A second major input into this thesis came from several
conferences, meetings and seminars on new developments in
federal procurement policy attended by the author. The
majority of the conferences and seminars were sponsored by
the National Contract Management Association (NCMA) and by
the Naval Air Executive Institute (NAEI) .
Data concerning Circular A-109 and its implementation by
DOD and the Navy were collected by three means. First, for-
mal, prepared presentations by the attendees were taped and
transcribed by the author. Second, informal smaller study
groups were attended. Third, personal interviews were con-
ducted, separately, with key personnel to obtain each parti-
cipant's impressions and viewpoints on Circular A-109 and
19

its implementation. Those attending these conferences and
seminars included key personnel from the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, Department of Defense, Navy Program Man-
agers, as well as several key civilian personnel from the
major DOD-contract corporations. A listing of participants
and organizations represented at these conferences is given
in Appendix A.
Although limited, a literature search was conducted into
publications pertaining to Circular A-109 and its implementa-
tion. While there is reference to Circular A-109 in OFPP
and DOD directives and documents and in General Accounting
Office (GAO) reports, there is very little reference to Cir-
cular A-109 implementation in other documents, public or
private. There have been some recent magazine articles, most
notably in The Government Executive
,
regarding Circular A-109
All of this is said to encourage future research in this area
as publications and documentation begin to appear in this
important area of federal acquisition policy.
20

II . ENVIRONMENT PRIOR TO CIRCULAR A-1Q9
In this section, the economic rationale of government re-
source allocation leading to the issuance of Circular A-109
is covered along with a brief history of major system acqui-
sition. The executive and legislative branch interactions
involving procurement reforms leading to the establishment of
the Commission on Government Procurement are analyzed. This
section concludes by examining the Commission on Government
Procurement and 12 of its recommendations involving major syS'
tern acquisitions which led to the establishment of OFPP and
the issuance of Circular A-109.
A. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
In recent years, federal, state and local expenditures
in the United States have accounted for about 30% of the
annual gross national product. Slightly over two-thirds of
this amount has been for "exhaustive" public expenditures.
These expenditures are for goods and services whose produc-
tion generates benefits that are consumed by most households.
Indeed, each member's consumption of a public good does not
reduce the consumption available to other members. In the
case of national defense, marginal social benefits are the
sum of the marginal private benefits [Ref . 8]
.
National security economics is concerned with choosing
economic policy and techniques to allocate resources most
efficiently. National security (an economic view) depends
21

on: (1) the quantity of national resources at a given time
and threat level; (2) the proportion of these resources dedi-
cated to defense purposes; and (3) the efficiency of alloca-
tion of these defense resources [Ref. 9].
The executive branch dominates the defense economics and
policy-making system. Congress processes structural issues
while the executive branch processes strategic issues. When
Congress does act on defense issues, it tends to support in-
creases in defense programs as proposed by the executive
branch [Ref. 10] „ The executive branch has the power to set
policy and budgets to implement programs to achieve the de-
sired strategic posture.
The broad issue of budget "controllability" is of utmost
concern to the President and the Congress, The federal bud-
get is in a dilemma for the next few years; that is, it is
difficult to cut and control through appropriation bills
(see Figure 1 )
.
Even the so-called "controllable" defense spending is,
in reality, beyond the reach of the annual budget cutters.
Who would cut the military payroll in half? Who would stop
all federal aid to education?
The 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act (88
STAT 297) makes it difficult to enact spending programs that
are exempt from the controls of its appropriation process,
and it requires Congress to consider the consequences over
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On August 28, 1977, President Carter projected a 3% per
year growth, (above inflation and adjustments) , of the de-
fense budget for the next four years. Taking the FY 1978
budget as a base at 109 billion dollars and compounding at




PROJECTED DEFENSE BUDGETS 1978-1982
1978 (BASE) 109 BILLION






Until recently, defense budgets have been essentially dol-
lar constant, actually losing spending power when accounting
for inflation. Concern is growing that the Soviets are con-
sidering a massive first strike against the U.S. This could
lead to a condition where increased defense spending is ac-
ceptable to the masses and welcomed by both the President and
Congress. When considering the controllable aspects of de-
fense spending, there is a congressional (and possibly Presi-
dential) desire to regain control of the budget by encourag-
ing controllable budget increases while discouraging uncon-
trollable budget increases.
This thesis concentrates on recent economic acquisition
policy changes for public goods resource allocation and the
"potential" for widespread acceptance of these new economic
tools. Specifically, Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-109, Major Systems Acquisition, is examined for
future impact on how the U.S. federal agencies will acquire
their "big ticket" items.
B. ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
During the 1950 cold war era, there was a perceived tech-
nology race against the Soviets. Acquisition strategy could
be characterized by having performance and schedule as driv-
ing factors. There was little time for requirements defini-
tion of major systems. Concurrency in development and pro-
duction was normal practice. Cost growth, poor performance,
duplication of design and effort were prevalent among the
services. These problems and many others were detailed by
early analysis [Ref= 12].
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Major system acquisition strategy was sought and re-
sulted in a revision to DOD Directive 3200,9 (1965) [Ref,
13] and was a major policy guidance directive issued on
Concept Formulation and Contract Definition by Secretary of
Defense McNamara, This was the first "building block" in
the establishment of a coordinate framework of policy for-
mulation and implementation for DOD system acquisition.
Policy formulation and decision making shifted from the ser-
vices to the highest levels of DOD. This process eventually
led to a formalized decision-making body which is known
today as Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
.
This directive attempted to establish a logical frame-
work of decision making for major DOD program implementation
Reliance on contracting was used as a primary instrument for
preventing cost overruns. Contract definition and total
package procurement using fixed price contracts, produced
an overly rigid Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) control
of the acquisition process that resulted in the procurement
disasters such as buy-ins, bail-outs, (F-lll, C-5A)
.
There was a flurry of government studies of the acquisi-
tion process during these times, The Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel (1969-1970) [Ref. 14] noted three major deficiencies
in requirements definition:
(1) The services were faulted for developing
requirements that were too specific.
( 2 ) The needs of the operating forces were
being subordinated to the parochial in -
terests within the services.




These requirements definition criticisms imply that the
formulation of needs was still unstructured, uncoordinated
and lacked control. The panel further criticized the lack
of a meaningful program review after the initial OSD deci-
sion to proceed into Engineering Development, the over-opti-
mism of contractors and services in dealing with technical
unknowns, reliance on "paper studies" versus critical hard-
ware experiments, and the inhibiting effects on innovation.
Upon change of Administration, Mr. David Packard, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, issued policy guidance in 1970 that
resulted in DOD Directive 5000.1 [Ref, 15] and formalized
the DSARC process, The intent of this directive was to:
-decentralize decision-making from OSD to the
servive components,,
-define authority and responsibility for key
organizations and individuals.
-define OSD milestone decision points and
substantiating elements.
Due to continuing procurement disasters, Congress commis-
sioned (HR 474, PL 91-129) the Commission on Government Pro-
curement (COGP) in 1969. Unlike most past commissions that
were constrained to deal with segments of the acquisition
process, the COGP looked at the entire Federal procurement
process across all agencies. The Commission was tasked to
investigate the following:
-The re-evaluation and improvement of policies for
the government to acquire goods and services in a
timely, economical and competitive manner.





-The correction of duplication, or gaps in laws,
regulations and directives,
-Uniformity and simplicity when appropriate,
-Fai r dealings
.
-Overall coordination of Federal procurement programs.
A more detailed look at the COGP and its recommendations
pertaining to major system acquisition is presented later in
this section.
Various service studies [Refs, 16, 17, 18] were conducted
in 1974-1975 and r e- emphas i zed the recommendations of the
COGP report.
This brief history sets the stage for the discussion of
Circular A-109 and its acquisition policy directives for fed-
eral agency major system acquisitions, A more detailed his-
tory of major system acquisition is given in Ref . 19. A
chronology of events pertaining to this thesis is given in
Appendix B. A summary chart of management studies is given
in Appendix C .
C. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The late sixties was an era of increasing awareness in
Congress of the costliness of many government programs and
of the dangers of ineffective or inefficient management,
Mr. Gordon Rule, Division of Procurement Control, Naval Mate-
rial Command, and Mr. A. E, Fitzgerald, Deputy for Management
Systems, Office of Secretary of the Air Force, were being
heard by Congress, Their allegations and warnings were re-
cognized. Congress was concerned with the increasingly com-
plex job of controlling procurement expenditures. The
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evolution of this concern into the specific acquisition pol-
icy promulgated in Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-109 will be traced.
Representative Chet Holifield (D. Calif.) , describing
the early Congressional reaction to the concern said [Ref
=
21] :
"...my subcommittee suggested in March 1966, that
the Bureau of the Budget study the idea of a
Presidentially-appointed board "to consider the
direction and the effects of procurement policies and
government programs on a gi vernment-wide basis.
When six months went by without any visible action by
the Bureau of the Budget, ...I planned to go ahead and
have Congress take the initiative in establishing a
commi s s ion .
"
In 1967, Rep. Holifield introduced a bill (HR 12510) to
create a Commission on Government Procurement. In November
1967, the House Committee on Government Operations reported
the bill (H Rept 90-890). However, "...the Rules Committee
deferred action on the bill in 1968, even though it had the
support of the Johnson administration" [Ref . 20]
.
These early efforts at reforming the procurement process
could not muster adequate Congressional support, "The com-
mittees conducting investigations, and particularly the
Armed Services Committee, looked askance at the idea of a
commission, believing it would deflect attention from their
work or cause postponement of needed reforms" [Ref. 21] 3
In 1969, however, the tide changed and interest in procure-
ment matters increased dramatically" [Ref, 20]
.
"Several.
. .committees and commissions.
. .examined
government procurement practices and related problems
during 1969... The Joint Economic Subcommittee on
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Economy in Government, chaired by Senator Proxmire,
. . .examined "major instances of waste c.nd inefficiency"
in hearings on the military budget.., A group of Demo-
cratic Members of Congr es s . . . conduc ted a Conference on
the Military Budget and National Priorities. . ," ,
Other groups were actively pursuing similar topics in
1969; among them were the previously mentioned Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel, the Packard Commission, and the National
Goals Research Staff [Ref. 20]:
"In the ninety-first Congress, the picture changed
for several reasons," Rep, Holifield has said. "In the
first place, we did a much more extensive job of identi-
fying major problem areas and documenting support for
the commission, Secondly, the Armed Services Committee
withdrew its opposition in the face of the evident need
for a serious study of government procurement. Thirdly,
and perhaps most important of all, members of Congress,
whether supporters or critics of the military establish-
ment, wanted constructive action."
In January 1969, Rep. Holifield and others introduced
HR 474 to establish the Commission on Government Procurement
In the period March-May, hearings were held before the Mili-
tary Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations which Rep, Holifield chaired. In early August,
the full Committee reported the bill. On September 23, the
House passed the bill and sent it to the Senate. A proposed
amendment to require bipartisan appointments to the Commis-
sion was rejected [Ref. 20]
,
On September 24, the Senate Committee on Government
Operations reported S 1707 to establish a commission on
government purchasing. This bill was similar to HR 474. On
September 26, the Senate passed HR 474 after substituting
the provisions of S 1707. The conference c o rami t tee reported
(H Rept 91-613) , a bill that was essentially a series of
29

compromises between HR 474 and S 1707 (Congressional appoint-
ments would be on a bipartisan basis) . During November,
both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference re-
port, and the President signed it into law (PL 91-129) [Ref.
20] .
The purpose of the commission was to undertake a compre-
hensive and detailed study of government procurement and to
report its findings and recommendations to the Congress
within two years. Its recommendations were to be developed
toward reforming regulations, eliminating waste, duplication
and inefficiency and reducing costs. The commission was
empowered to issue subpoenas, and it was given an open-ended
authorization for whatever funds were required for its opera-
tions (H Rept 91-613) =
In early 1971 it became evident that the Commission
would not be able to meet its reporting deadline. This was
caused, in part, by a five month delay in appointing a full
complement of commission members and by the reluctance of
industry to release high-ranking personnel for commission
work [Ref. 22]. Consequently, the reporting deadline was
extended to December 1972 (HR 4343, PL 92-47). Rep. Holi-
field, who introduced the bill, is quoted as saying
[Ref. 21]
:
"We would have made it a straight 12 -mo nth extension
but then that report would have been brought out just
before the election and there would have been a lot of
charges of partisan politics. So far, in this work,
there has not been one degree of par ti sanship . . . And we
felt to bring out the report right before the 1972 Presi-
dential election, it would either be buried insofar as
attention is concerned, or it would be called partisan
by one side or the other."
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Meanwhile, an event which was later to become relevant
was taking place, the Office of Management and Budget was
es tabli shed
.
On April 5, 1970, President Nixon appointed the Presiden-
tial Advisory Council on Executive Reorganization. Mr, Roy
L. Ash, recently president of Litton Industries, was appoin-
ted to the chairmanship. "Of all the areas suggested for
study,. the council concluded that the 31-year old Executive
Office of the President was most in need of reorganization,"
Ash said [Ref . 23] . Subsequently, President Nixon proposed
to divide the Executive Office of the President into two
branches: The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) and the
Domestic Council. 0MB would be built around the nucleus of
the then existing Bureau of the Budget (which would be
abolished) and would carry on and expand the Bureau's func-
tions. It would create a greater executive capability for
analyzing, coordinating, evaluating, and improving the effec-
tiveness of government programs. It would pick up, to some
extent, where the programming, planning and budgeting system
left off. The Domestic Council would advise the President
on programs and policies outside the military and foreign
affairs areas [Ref. 23].
A resolution disapproving the reorganization was reported
by the House Committee on Government Operations. Its key
objections were the transference of Bureau of Budget statu-
tory responsibility to the Presidnet and the absence of a
requirement for Senate confirmation of the new Directors. A
coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats defeated the
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resolution. No resolution of disapproval was introduced in
the Senate,, The reorganization plan went into effect in
mid-May because Congress failed to disapprove it within the
60 day period allowed by the Reorganization Act of 1949
[Ref . 23]
.
On December 31, 1972, the Commission submitted its final
report to the Congress. It contained many fundamental re-
commendations for the reform of procurement policy.
A further discussion of Congressional interaction with
the major system acquisition process is given in Refs. 24
and 25,
D. COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
As previously discussed, the Commission on Government
Procurement was created by Public Law 91-129 in November
1969 after extensive Congressional hearings dealing with
government acquisition problems, The COGP was charged by
Congress to study and recommend methods "to promote the
economy, efficiency and effectiveness" of procurement by the
executive branch of the Federal Government, The COGP was to
be a bipartisan, 12 member body, composed of Congressmen,
Senators and representatives from the private sector and
the government. A list of commission members along with the
professional staffs is given in Appendix D,
The COGP ' s purpose was to accomplish four objectives in
the overall goal of improving the acquisition process.




-Establishing a common framework that highlights the
key decisions for all involved organizations— Congress,
agency heads, service components, and the private
sector for the purpose of having a common set of pro-
cedures for initiating, conducting, and controlling
programs
„
-Defining the role each organization is to play in
order to exercise its proper level of responsibility
and control over acquisition programs,
-Giving visibility to Congress and agency heads to
exercise their responsibilities by providing them
with the information needed to make key program
decisions and commitments.
-Improving the means for assuring public accountability
as a substitute for the burden of present administra-
tive reporting and surveillance procedures.
The COGP was given a broad charter by Congress to take
an integrated view of the deficiencies in major system ac-
quisition and identify the problems in program implementa-
tion. After two and one-half years of intensive study and
over 150,000 pages of feeder reports submitted by working
groups of the Commission, the COGP presented its report to
Congre ss
.
The major problems incurred in the acquisition of major
systems investigated by the COGP are summarized in Column 1
of Table 11= DOD's efforts to correct these problems are
shown in Column 2, Column 3 highlights additional changes
recommended by the COGP which not only support current DOD
policy, but extend to the fundamentals of the acquisition
process not previously addressed in DOD policy.
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Acquisition of Research and Development
Acquisition of Major Systems
Acquisition of Commercial Products
Acquisition of Construction and
Architect-Engineer Services
Federal Grant-type Assistance Programs
Volume 4
Part G. Legal and Administrative Remedies
Part H. Selected Issues of Liability; Government
Property and Catastrophic Accidents
Part I. Patents, Technical Data, and Copyrights
Part J, Other Statutory Considerations
Of the 149 recommendations made by the COGP , 12 recom-
mendations contained in Volume 2, Part C involved improve-
ments to major system acquisitoino A list of these 12 re-
commendations is given in Appendix E»
These recommendations indicate that a systems approach
is needed to improve the major system acquisition process.
The framework of this systems approach is presented in
Figure 2, illustrating the four basic steps recommended by
the COGP, namely:
1. Establishing needs and goals.
2. Exploring alternative systems.
3. Choosing preferred system.
4. Implementing final development, production, and use
Each numbered section in the diagram correlates with the
corresponding COGP recommendation in Appendix E.
The U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations of
the 94th Congress, created a Subcommittee on Federal spend-
ing Practices, Efficiency, and Open Government to provide a













































practices, particularly Federal procurement. A major part
of this review was directed toward the report of the COGP,
in particular those 12 recommendations made by the Commission
concerning the controversial area of acquiring major systems.
The Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency, and Open Govern-
ment Subcommittee is continuing to investigate the recommen-
dations of the Commission and to develop a legislative pro-
gram to implement the needed changes.
The Department of Defense, in response to the recommenda-
tions of the Commission, set three embryonic programs on the
path perceived in the recommendations. These were the
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (Air Force), the Pershing
II Program (Army) , and the Shipboard Intermediate Range Com-
bat System (SIRCS) (Navy) . Congress requested that the GAO
examine the programs for compliance with the Commission's
recommendations. The GAO found that only SIRCS "had any sig-
nificant similarity to the beginning steps of the Commission's
plan" [Ref. 27]. This "significant similarity" resulted
because the SIRCS program office worked closely with OFPP in
developing their acquisition strategy [Ref. 28] » The program
office has been concerned not only with the development of
the SIRCS but also with conducting a "model A-109 program"
as well. From all appearances, at least in the case of SIRCS,




Ill . OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A-109
In this section, the evolution of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy from the first two recommendations of the
Commission on Government Procurement to its issuance of Cir-
cular A-109 is traced. The contents of Circular A-109 are
analyzed and its executive agency implementation is illus-
trated using OFFP Pamphlet No. 1. The relationship of Cir-
cular A-109 with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Act of 1974, mission area budgeting and zero-based budgeting
is presented. Finally, some inherent problems associated
with the implementation of Circular A-109 are investigated.
A OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY
The statutory framework governing federal procurement
was one area of particular concern to the Commission on Gov-
ernment Procurement, There were numerous inconsistencies be-
tween the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 which gov-
erned the procurement system of DOD, the Coast Guard, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949 which governed the procurement systems of other
Federal agencies. The COGP declared in its report that the
existing statutory foundation is a combination of disparate
and confusing restrictions and grants of limited authority
to avoid the restrictions, The COGP believed that the
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consolidation of the procurement statues under the guidance
of one office would be a major step in fostering a regula-
tory system which would facilitate rather than hamper those
wishing to do business with the Federal Government. Thus,
the COGP proposed two recommendations which were to be the
genius of OFPP [Ref. 26]:
Recommendation 1 . Establish by law a central Office
of Federal Procurement Policy in the Executive Office
of the President, preferably in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, with specialized competence to take
the leadership in procurement policy and related
matters. If not organizationally placed in OMB, the
office should be established in a manner to enable it
to testify before committees of Congress. It should
develop and persistently endeavor to improve ways and
means through which executive agencies can cooperate
with and be responsive to Congress.
Recommendation 2 . Enact legislation to eliminate in-
consistencies in the two primary procurement statutes
by consolidating the two statutes and thus provide a
common statutory basis for procurement policies and
procedures applicable to all executive agencies,
Retain in the statutory base for an Office of Federal
Procurement Policy in the executive branch to imple-
ment basic procedure policies.
The characteristics of the new office as envisioned by
the Commission were to "be independent of any agency having
procurement responsibility..., operate on a plane above the
procurement agencies and have directive rather than merely
advisory authority..., be responsive to Congress..., consist
of a small ... cadre of seasoned procurement experts" [Ref. 29]
While logic seemed to dictate location of OFPP in OMB,
there was concern that authorizing legislation would become
embroiled in the Congress vs. Ash dispute (as discussed later
in this section) . As a result, the Senate Committee on
Government Operations delayed its actions, Alternatives
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considered were an independent agency, location in the
General Services Administration, and location in the General
Accounting Office. But all had flaws [Ref . 30]
:
An independent agency would have little clout
in applying policies to a giant such as the Defense
Department. ..oDefense Department would oppose
location of...0FPP in GSA, another operating agency
engaged in government- s ide procurement ... Location
in GAO would involve conflict of interest, The
agency establishing procurement policies would also
be the agency investigating procurement actions,
Interestingly, by placing the Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy (OFPP) in the Executive Office of the President,
its policy promulgations would have the force of an Execu-
tive Order, which in turn would have the force of law unless
specifically revoked by Congress. The GAO has stated that
OFPP Circulars and rulings "have the force and effect of law."
This fact, as discussed later in Section III. bo, is signi-
ficant .
The Congress vs. Ash dispute had two main roots; (1)
Congress was becoming increasingly concerned with the growth
of Executive power during the Nixon administration [31], and
(2) Mr. Roy L, Ash, Former President of Litton Industries,
whom Nixon appointed as the first director of the 0MB, be-
came a controversial figure when Litton' s large cost overruns
ecame known and allegations of mismanagement were made.
Senator Proxmire was especially "ruffled" by Ash's appoint-
ment [32] .
In early 1973, the House and Senate passed S 518 which
would have required retroactive Senate confirmation of the
Director and Deputy Director of the 0MB, That would have
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given the Senate a chance to examine the background and
credentials of Mr. Ash, President Nixon vetoed the bill,
and the House sustained the veto.
In June, the Senate passed S 37 which required confirma-
tion only of future appointees, After dropping a four-year
term provision and formally transferring powers to the OMB
Director (which were then held by the President but dele-
gated) , the House passed the bill in late December. The
Senate accepted the amendments in February 1974, and the
bill was signed into law in March [31]
.
With apparent resolution of the Congress- vs . -Ash dispute
taking shape in the form of S 37, the Congress returned to
the problem of procurement,, The Senate Government Opera-
tions Committee named an ad hoc subcommittee on Federal Pro-
curement to implement the recommendations of the COGP with
legislation [33] . Senator Lawton Chiles (a freshman Demo-
crat from Florida) chaired the subcommittee. The House Com-
mittee on Government Operations also formed a subcommittee,
chaired by Rep. Holifield.
In the hearings before the various committees, the
Executive branch (as represented by DOD) and industry took
somewhat different but predictable positions on the recom-
mended OFPP .
DOD took a conservative, incremental stand as typified
by the testimony of A. I. Mendolia, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Logistics [Ref. 33]:
He expressed concern that the OFPP might usurp
the procurement policy direction that the office of
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the Secretary of Defense now exercises ,.. Mendolia sug-
gested that "a small, competent Procurement Council"
might be organized to coordinate interagency policies.,.
"Defense Department recommends building on the present
Procurement structure. . .What is needed is to establish
this coordination point at the apex of an existing
pyramid .
"
Industry, on the other hand, encouraged immediate estab-
lishment of the OFPP and that sweeping reforms be made.
Also, the hearings were used as a forum to sharpen their
edge of the ax. The testimony of the Aerospace Industries
Association, the Electronic Industries Association and the
National Security Industrial Association had three main
thrusts [Ref , 29]
:
The present situation of mountainous piles of
policy, . .and regulations ... is intolerable. Uniformity
and simplicity. . .should be the guidelines of the new
office .
A basic policy of the new office should be fairness
to the contractor as well as the contracting agency.
The new office should serve as an appeals court for
contractors when government agencies ... fai 1 to
implement properly the policies.
Finally, in 1974, the OFPP was established. Senator
Chiles introduced 3 2510 which would place OFPP in the
Executive Office of the President but independent of the 0MB
While the Senate passed the bill, the House amended it to
place OFPP in 0MB. The Senate accepted the amendment and
the President signed on 20 August as PL 93-400 [Ref. 34]
:
The bill included detailed language to ensure the
administrator's independence, including separate
authorizations for the OFPP, a requirement that the
administrator, rather than the 0MB Director, keep
Congress informed of OFPP activities, a provision
vesting the functions of OFPP in the administrator
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rather than in the OMB director (the only other 0MB
official having statutory powers) and a requirement
that the administrator could not be given any func-
tions not provided in the bill.
The Congress viewed the OFPP as the guarantor that the
COGP recommendations would be seriously considered in the
executive branch. Congress also saw the OFPP as a focal
point with special competence and leadership in Government-
wide procurement and procurement-related matters. For the
first time, Congress, industry, small businessmen, private
citizens, and executive agencies have one place to go on
procurement policy matters.
Hugh E. Witt was nominated by President Ford as the
Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy on November 19,
confirmed December 19, and sworn in on December 31, 1974.
Thus, the OFPP became operational December 31, 1974.
The OFPP was set up with a staff of 16 professionals and
six clerical positions. Hugh E, Witt, the first administra-
tor said [Ref . 3 5]:
I'm very pleased with the caliber of people that
were interested in serving in this new office.
Collectively, we have over 300 years of procurement
related experience. The staff also reflects a good
cross-sec tion ... four from industry, two from
congressional staff, four from civil agencies,
five from Department of Defense and one from
Office of Management and Budget.
OFPP was established to provide overall direction of
procurement policies, regulations, procedures, and forms
within the executive branch. The Office was created to
improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
procurement of property and services by the executive
agenc ie s .
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While Public Law 93-400 sets forth the following six
specific functions of the OFPP , Congress viewed the respon-
sibilities of OFPP in a broad sense, encompassing the dis-
ciplines covered by the 149 recommendations of the COGP
[Ref 36]
:
-Establish a system of coordinated, and to the extent
feasible, uniform procurement regulations.
-Establish criteria for soliciting the viewpoints of
interested parties in the development of procurement
policies and regulations.
-Monitor policies relating to reliance by the
Federal Government on the private sector to provide
needed property and services.
-Promote and conduct research in procurement policies.
-Establish a procurement data system which takes
into account the needs of Congress, the executive
branch, and the private sector.
-Promote programs for recruitment, training, career
development, and performance evaluation of procure-
ments personnel.
The organization and functions of the OFPP are described
in detail in Section 225 of the Office of Management and
Budget Manual [Ref. 37]. An overview structure of OFPP is
given in Appendix F.
B. CIRCULAR A-109 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE
No activity of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP) has received a higher priority of more attention than
the development and implementation of a Government-wide
policy for the acquisition of major systems. This policy
was promulgated as Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-109 [Ref. 1] on April 5, 1975. Full implementation of
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Circular A-109 will revolutionize the way in which major
Federal system acquisition programs are initiated and for
which billions of dollars are spent. A measure of its sig-
nificance is the fact that, in January 1977, GAO estimated
that the cost to complete major systems acquisition programs
of the executive branch now underway was $452.2 billion [Ref.
38] .
OMB Circular A-109 is consistent with the intent of the
12 recommendations of the Commission on Government Procure-
ment concerning major systems acquisition. It also reflects
the results of the Major Systems Acquisition Reform Hearings
conducted by the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices,
Efficiency, and Open Government of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations, during the period May 20-July 24, 1975,
and August 24 and 26, 1976.
On August 26, 1976, the Honorable Lawton Chiles (D-Fla)
,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices, Effi-
ciency, and Open Government, stated the following:
"At this time 4 years ago, the Congressional Commission
on Government Procurement, on which I served, was
reviewing a draft report on major systems for final
approval. It proposed an integrated package of 12
reforms recommendations to overhaul the policies which
control 585 major programs worth some $404 billion -
everything from defense weapons to energy, transporta-
tion, and education systems. Of that $404 billion,
$148 billion is in cost overruns, according to the
General Accounting Office..,
"The reforms that were proposed by the Commission are
s ignif i can to..
"The reforms call for a new front end for these programs,
with new decisions by agency heads and the Congress on
mission need. The new mission need decision, before any




"The reforms also call for more effective competition-
starting not with a preordained, gold-plated paper
design produced by agencies in concert with major
contractors - but, instead, starting with a basic
statement of the problem - the mission need - with all
of industry, small and new firms included, having a
chance to use their best technology.,.
"The reforms call for a modern management of Government
programs, integrated to bring together our wealth of
technology with national needs, to cut through the
barriers of bureaucratic waste..,,"
Circular A-109 was extensively coordinated with the
executive agencies, congressional staffs, industry represen-
tatives, and other interested parties. Almost 150 separate
comments were received on three drafts of the Circular that
were circulated for comment. In addition, a public meeting
on the policy was held in Washington on December 16, 1975.
A principal intent of the reforms embodied in Circular
A-109 is to reorient competition for major systems and focus
it on the earlier phases of the process, not just on full-
scale development. It is intended that competition will be
broader based, require less commitment of resources by the
competitors, and provide the best solutions to national needs
primarily through industrial innovation.
a. - - .&-
-Express needs and program objectives in mission terms
and not equipment terms to encourage innovation and
competition in creating, exploring, and developing
alternative systems.
-Place emphasis on the initial phase of the system
acquisition process to allow competitive exploration
of alternative systems to meet mission needs.
-Communicate with Congress early in the system acquisi-
tion process by relating major system acquisition
programs to agency mission needs, This communication
should follow the requirements of 0MB Circular A-109




-Establish clear lines of authority, responsibility,
and accountability for management of major systems,
make decisions at appropriate managerial levels, and
obtain agency head approval at key decision points
in the evolution of each acquisition program,,
-Designate a focal point to integrate and unify the
system acquisition management process and monitor
policy implementation.
-Rely on private industry in accordance with the policy
established by OMB Circular A-76.
Circular A-109 (Appendix G) is written in rather simple
language and contains only 12 pages (two of which are taken
up with definitions) . It is not a rigid guide for all situ-
ations but a flexible invitation to exercise judgement with-
in certain boundaries, It recognizes that each major system
acquisition program is unique in terms of time, cost, tech-
nology, management and contracting approach. Despite these
differences, the basic process and principal activities in
the process are common to all programs. Circular A-109
addresses this basic process and provides an integrated
framework to unify mission needs with program implementation
Circular A-109 emphasizes top Congress and Executive
leadership at the front end of the systems acquisition cycle
It states that while "technical and program decisions nor-
mally will be made at the agency-component or operating-
activity level," four key decisions "should be made by the
agency head." These four decisions are [Ref. 1]
:
-Identification and definition of a specific mission
need to be fulfilled; the relative priority assigned
within the agency, and the general magni-inves t ed
;
-Selection of competitive system design concepts to be
advanced to a test/demonstration phase or authoriza-
tion to proceed with the development of a noncompeti-
tive (single concept) system;
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-Commitment of a system to full-scale development and
limited production;
-Commitment of a system to full production.
Significant benefits anticipated from implementation of
Circular A-109 included:
-Greatly reduced cost overruns and elimination of
much of the controversy of the past two decades
regarding the need for specific systems.
-Improved opportunities for innovative private
sector contributions to meet national needs.
-Information flow between agencies and Congress
consistent with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
-An orderly process for acquiring major systems in
all agencies, thus eliminating inconsistencies of
management attention and approach while providing
flexibility for agencies to meet unique needs.
If these policies are implemented as intended, savings
of billions of dollars could be realized by avoiding the
start-up of programs that are later cancelled because the
need did not exist, other programs were given higher pri-
ority, or other less costly ways were found to satisfy the
need. In addition, when programs have been initially re-
cognized as required to meet a need, the agency head will
have an opportunity to reevaluate the need periodically
and reorder priorities as necessary. Dollar expenditures
required can also be reevaluated as a program proceeds from
system definition, through commitment to full scale system
development and limited production, to commitment of full
system production. The exercise of these new techniques
will have a favorable impact upon the Federal budget.
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To further amplify the intent of Circular A-109 and help
integrate these four key decision points into the major Sys-
tem Cycle, OFPP issued OFPP Pamphlet No. 1 in August 1976
[Ref . 4] . The macro-view of the life cycle of a major system
is depicted as shown in Figure 3.
The Major System Acquisition Cycle is seen as a single
closed loop with the four key decision points indicated by
circled numbers. The various activities indicated before
and after these decision points are themselves interactive
loops within the single closed loop providing feedback at
each decision point. The feedback loops are not drawn on
the figure for clarification and simplification purposes.
The most logical point at which to enter the Major Sys-
tem Acquisition Cycle to evaluate content of Circular A-109
is at the "Mission Analysis" activity. Here, the Agency's
science and technology base is drawn upon in the generation
of a mission need. This science and technology base will
is continuously reviewed throughout the acquisition life
cycle. In the mission anlaysis, the Agency's goals and ob-
jectives are analyzed to ensure consistency of the develop-
ing need with them* Technical advancements are investigated
for opportunities to improve the Agency's operations.
Deficiencies in the Agency's current capabilities to accom-
plish its mission are examined. Cost reductions, such as
ownership costs, are questioned for improvements. Agency
environments, such as to national defense for DOD, are
analyzed to ensure mission capabilities are not impaired.
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From this mission analysis and evaluation comes a need to
accomplish an agency's goals and objectives. This need will
be written in terms of mission purpose, end objectives, capa-
bilities, time constraints, value of meeting the need, the
environment in which the need must survive, relative priority
and operating constraints. For example, within DOD, current
inventories must be recognized. The agency can not simply
come out with a need and wipe the slate clean and start over.
Existing force levels, existing research and development and
existing programs could be considered constraints. It should
be noted that the need should not be written in terms of a
specific equipment solution.
Once the need has been evaluated and reconciled in the
context of agency mission, resources and priorities, the
first key decision point (indicated by the circled "1" in
Figure 3) is reached. At this point, the agency head has
the option of agreeing and approving the mission need state-
ment. It is at this point that the agency begins to bring
together the budget and procurement aspects of the process,
Here the agency works with OMB articulating the mission
need in putting the President's Budget together, As dis-
cussed in the next segment, beginning in FY 79, each agency
will be required by law to submit budget information in
accordance with assigned agency mission areas and to relate
agency programs to these missions. The Congressional Budget
Act of 1974 along with Circular A-109 provides the basis for
establishing an earlier, more meaningful communication with
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Congress in the budget process. The objective is to have
Congressional level issues regarding needs resolved earlier
in the Major System Acquisition Cycle before the commitment
of major resources and selection of solutions, Congress
would then ostensibly withdraw from its traditional annual
process of detailed review of system solutions and data and
focus on the broader questions of agency missions and roles
(a more appropriate role for Congress) . This would permit
Congress to consider the need within the context of overall
national priorities of other programs and needs.
Mr. Fred Dietrich, OFPP , in an appearance before the
National Contract Management Association (NCMA) meeting on
26 May 1977 [Ref. 39] gave a pertinent example of this
earlier involvement of Congress in the debate of mission
need existence. The U. S. Air Force in advocating the B-l
bomber aircraft was seeking a replacement for the aging
B-52 aircraft as the third leg of the Strategic Triad.
According to Mr. Dietrich, the B-l controversy would not
have occurred had the need been resolved through debate with
Congress at the onset of the problem and not after millions
of dollars had already been spent. The Air Force proposed
both the need and solution simultaneously to Congress after
much delay caused by internal disagreement within the Air
Force. Had the need for the B-l aircraft been approved by
the Congress initially, there would have been no necessity
to debate the mission need at each budget cycle and the pro-




Circular A-109 proposes that a program manager be as-
signed to the newly formed program immediately following
the first decision point. The program manager would be
designated in writing and would be given a charter with
clear channels of authority and accountability. Anyone im-
pacting on decisions made by the program manager in his ex-
ploration of alternative system must document those actions,
The program manager would be a solution advocate, vice a
need advocate, and would eventually come back to the agency
head with an evaluation of alternative concept designs. The
prime purpose of the program manager at this point would be
to initiate program implementation, The program manager's
first actions would be directed at assembling a program team
and initiating an acquisition strategy. (The term strategy
is used to indicate a dynamic, evolving process as opposed
to a plan indicating a rather inflexible process.)
The program acquisition strategy can be broken down into
three basic areas - management, technical and business - and
tailored for that particular program. In the management por-
tion of the acquisition strategy, the program manager devel-
ops his program office structure -whether to have a large
self-contained office composed of all resources and discip-
lines pertinent to the program (such as a U. S. Air Force
SPO) or to have a matrix office composed of a small cadre of
dedicated personnel who draw upon functional offices to sup-
plement (such as Uo S. Navy Project Offices) . In the tech-
nology acquisition strategy, system engineering decision
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making and staffing details are addressed. If a purely man-
agement organization is to be used during the concept evalu-
ation phase to integrate contractors, then provisions to
ensure hardware accountability should be made. In the busi-
ness acquisition strategy, items such as the different types
of contracts to be used in each of the phases should be con-
sidered. An analysis should be made of program life cycle
costs such as ownership costs and des ign- to-cos t goals and
methods for measuring cost and performance progress and
financial planning.
The acquisition strategy formulated by the program mana-
ger will form a basis to communicate with all levels of
management within his agency, his own program office team,
DOD and Congress, as well as with private industry. While
the acquisition strategy will encompass the entire program
life cycle, emphasis will necessarily be placed en near term
actions. As the program proceeds and periodic reviews are
made, successive phases of the acquisition strategy would
be emphasized. This incremental acquisition strategy called
for in Circular A-109 would minimize the administrative bur-
den and provide program direction to accomplish program
goals and objectives. At program initiation, the program
manager could not reasonably address all parameters antici-
pated in the program life cycle. The program manager would
possibly be providing support to a higher level manager,
initially, who would have the authority to coordinate actions
involving more than one existing system within a mission
area. By maintaining a flexible acquisition strategy, it is
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possible to evaluate and schedule critical decisions as the
program progresses.
In the "Exploration of Alternative Systems" phase of the
Major System Acquisition Cycle, the program manager will de-
pend on private sector for solicitation of system design
concepts. Innovative ideas could also come from government
labs, universities and other government funded organiza-
tions such as NRDC'S. These innovative ideas from govern-
ment sources would be made available to private industry in
formulating their response to request for proposals at the
contractor's option. As an example, the Navy's SIRCS pro-
gram provided several volumes of government furnished in-
formation to private industry in requesting proposals because
of a lack of updated operational expertise xn surface war-
fare platforms and scenarios. The information was used by
private industry in their concept formulation responses.
If, however, the agency head decides at the first key
decision point that a unique solution exists to his particu-
lar mission need because of technical or economic reasons,
then he may request the private sector to bid on this unique
approach. This action would be an exception to Circular A-
109 and would have to be documented and coordinated with
OFPP and 0MB.
OFPP can not interfere with the establishment of the
mission need or the need statement or the source selection
process. However, the budget examiners of 0MB can question
the agency's budgets for compliance with Circular A-109.
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The General Accounting Office (GAO) will still be the reci-
pient of protest regarding Circular A-109 non-compliance.
An example of this was the recent protest received by GAO
over the Air Force's F-16 aircraft [Ref . 39]
.
An important aspect of Circular A-109 is the early in-
vitation of meaningful competition by soliciting private
industry to develop alternative system concepts. An expanded
picture of the Exploration of Alternative System Phase is
presented in Figure 4. The program manager would issue a
Request for Proposal (RFP) with wide dissemination to both
large producers and small contractors to obtain a wide range
of innovative ideas and system design concepts. The desired
result in the contractor's response is a system design con-
cept or at least an understanding of the concept. What is
desired is a response to a mission need, not a prescribed
hardware solution nor a predetermined government specified
s oluti on
.
Evaluation of the RFP responses would be done by an in-
house team of technical specialists or through the assist-
ance of government labs, providing the labs had not sub-
mitted a response. After evaluating each of the proposals
and choosing the most feasible ones, the selected contrac-
tors would be provided funding through short term, parallel
contracts to refine their system concept approaches.
When the competing contractors submit their concept de-
sign proposals in response to the short term, parallel con-
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selection process with his program team. Assisting the pro-
gram manager in this task will be a team of experts in
various disciplines to evaluate the different aspects of
the proposals. This expertise will probably come from in-
house personnel, such as government labs not involved in sub-
mitting proposals or in government preconceived solutions.
For example, if the Naval Air Development Center (NADC) had
a predetermined solution regarding Vertical/Short Field Take-
Off/Landing (VSTOL) aircraft, then the program manager would
need to bring in other government experts, preferably with
previous VSTOL experience.
In this source selection phase, the most beneficial sys-
tem design concepts would be chosen based upon such para-
meters as cost of acquisition and ownership costs. Small,
highly technical companies would be considered if they could
demonstrate production development accountability such as
by teaming arrangements with larger hardware producing cor-
porations. These smaller companies would also have to
demonstrate viable production capabilities. Circular A-109
calls for, if economically feasible, multiple awards for
different design concepts during this phase.
The winning contractors of this source selection explora^
tion phase would have to have shown in the responses the
f ollowi ng
:
-Set of system functional requirements and specifica-
tions prepared by the contractor for his system design
concept, not a set of government specifications.
-System parameters and constraints.
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-Criteria to determine responsiveness of system design
concepts to meet the mission need.
-Feasibility analysis to demonstrate that the proposed
system concept is within the state-of-the-art, within
the framework of resource capabilities, and realize-
able in terms of allocated budget and in terms of
schedule
.
These first contracts could result in proposals to con-
tinue the design study, both concept and hardware, to reduce
the risk before proceeding with system. If the risk is low
and acceptable, these contracts could result in a hardware
proposal for competitive demonstration in the next phase.
The program manager upon completion of the source selec-
tion process can now go back through his agency's chain of
command with the acceptable proposals. The program manager
can recommend to the agency head that the selected alter-
nate system design concepts be pursued into the "Competi-
tive Demonstrations" phase. If the agency head deems it
not economically feasible to pursue multiple concepts and
the agency head chooses to pick only one proposal, this
again is an exception to Circular A-109 and should be coor-
dinated with OFPP/OMB. One of the main objectives of Cir-
cular A-109 is to keep competition alive throughout the
Major System Acquisition Cycle, even through production, if
economically feasible.
The second key decision point in the Major System Ac-
quisition Cycle (indicated by the circled "2" in Figure 3)
is reached. The agency head must reaffirm the mission need,
accounting for changes in priorities and threats. The pro-
gram manager, in turn, must ensure that the original
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baseline information is still valid. All acceptable system
alternatives are considered. The agency head then gives
his approval to proceed into the "Competitive Demonstration"
phase
.
The remaining phases and key decision points in the
Major System Acquisition cycle are similar to the activities
in the major system life cycle prior to the issuance of Cir-
cular A-109. For completeness of discussion, a brief over-
view of the remaining cycle will be given.
The Competitive Demonstration phase is used by the con-
tractors to transition their system design concept to experi-
mental hardware, The concepts are verified as being sound
and able to perform in an operational environment. These
demonstrations provide a basis for selection of system design
concepts to be continued into Full Scale Development (FSD)
phase. These competitive demonstrations normally involve
only critical subsystems, although in some cases could in-
volve a prototype of a complete development model.
At the third key decision point (circled "3" in Figure 3)
,
the agency head again reaffirms the mission need, program
objectives and risks. The agency head approves the alterna-
tive systems that have been competitively demonstrated to be
viable and gives his approval to proceed into the Full Scale
Development Test and Evaluation Phase.
During the FSD phase, critical sub- componen ts demon-
strated earlier are combined to a full scale prototype and
complete system demonstrations, test and evaluations are
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analyzed. During this phase before the production award is
made, a "fly-off" is required to be held if economically
feasible
.
At the fourth and final key decision point, (circled "4"
in Figure 3) , the agency head again reaffirms the mission
need and program objectives. He approves the final elimina-
tion among the remaining competitors to choose the best
system, or systems if economically feasible, that meet the
mission need within overall life cycle cost considerations
to proceed into production, deployment and operation.
A more graphic view of the Major System Acquisition Pro-
cess as specified in Circular A-109 is given in Figure 5.
This figure shows the same four key decision points by the
agency head. From program inception to the production deci-
sion, viable alternatives to system concepts are considered.
Each contractor carries his own unique concept through in
competition to the production award. The number of alterna-
tives are narrowed at each decision point (as indicated by
the two converging lines in Figure 5) by elimination of less
desirable system concepts. Successful contractors are
funded through parallel, short-term contracts to refine the
cycle. Evaluation of these system concepts is based on
actual testing and demonstrations of subcomponents or fully
operational prototypes depending on the phase of the program
cycle
.
A diagram often used to illustrate the life cycle of a





















of Circular A-109 is presented in Figure 6. This figure
shows the four key decision points for agency head approval.
This figure shows more graphically the consideration of
mission area analysis, taking into account the input para-
meters of technological advancements, cost of systems,
threats, money available, priorities and resources. The re-
sulting Mission Need Statement for the agency is displayed
prior to the new program of initiation decision point. The
phased activities between the key decision points are also
exhibited
.
Key issues inherent in Circular A-109 besides the formal
structuring of the Major System Acquisition Cycle include:
(.1) the designation of each agency of an "Acquisition Execu-
tive" to integrate and unify the mangement process for the
agency's major system acquisitions. He will be responsible
for developing and monitoring procedures and practices under
Circular A-109 implementation to ensure compliance within
the agency. Each agency which acquires - "or is responsible
for activities leading to the acquisition of" - major system
will establish "clear lines of authority, responsibility and
accountability for management of its major system acquisi-
tion programs" [Ref . 1]
.
(2) a separate fund to expand the technology base of each
agency. The money designated for a specific system develop-
ment should be with that system mission need. For example,
in the DOD and NASA Fiscal 1978 budgets, more than 35 new
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agencies have been spending small amounts of money for years
under the categories of "Research" or "Exploratory Develop-
ment. "
(3) a predetermined solution to the problem along v/ith the
statement of "need" should not be given to bidding contrac-
tors. Neither should prime contractors give their subcon-
tractors similar guidance. The guidance in both cases should
be "Here is our problem. What is your solution?"
(4)1 each agency through its program managers should ensure
appropriate trade-off among investment cost, ownership (life
cycle) costs, schedules and performance characteristics.
(5) exceptions to Circular A-109 must be approved by the
agency head. If an agency head chooses a single concept or
chooses to proceed with FSD on a critical subcomponent, such
as a jet engine for a developing aircraft, then he should
document and coordinate his actions with OFPP/OMB.
Regarding the implementation status of Circular A-109
among Federal agencies, OFPP reports that of the 22 major
Federal agencies affected, 19 agencies have submitted approved
plans although six of these have been approved subject to
the agency providing additional data. These 19 agencies
account for 99% of the Federal money spent. All 19 agencies
have appointed an "Acquisition Executive" and have defined
within their own agency's terms what constitutes a "Major
System." Nine agencies (including DOD) have issued imple-
menting instructions to their component elements although a




OMB oversight of Circular A-109 is evidenced by its in-
vestigation into each new major system start with the
agencies. The budget examiners are now asking, "Has the
agency head approved the mission need? Has the agency ap-
pointed a Program Manager? Has the program manager devel-
oped his acquisition strategy?" If the budget examiners
don't get satisfactory answers, then the program doesn't get
put in the President's budget. For example, the Social
Security Administration (SSA) requested an Automatic Data
Processing (ADP) system but neglected the budget examiners'
guidance on competing the system with several contractors
in accordance with Circular A-109. The SSA didn't come in
with an acceptable request and the ADP system involving
several missions of dollars was not put in the Fiscal Year
1978 budget.
The Legislative Branch interest in Circular A-109 imple-
mentation status is shown in the various Congressional com-
mittees and staff inquiries regarding compliance or noncom-
pliance of various budget requests. The General Accounting
Office (GAO) has conducted several studies involving program
compliance with Circular A-109 and has issued reports of an
ins true ti-nal nature regarding aspects of Circular A-109.
On March 10, 1977, Mr. Bert Lance, Director of the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, before the United States
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, stated with respect to
OMB Circular A-109 that:
"...Our objective is to promote broad acceptance and
understanding of the policy through an aggressive
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orientation and indoctrination program that reaches
both Government and industry groups."
Mr. Lester Fettig, Administrator, OFPP, confirmed the
emphasis OMB will place on the executive branch agency imple-
mentation of Circular A-109 in a recent interview [Ref . 40]
:
"During my confirmation hearings, I outlined my
objectives and priorities for the next 28 months
and expressed confidence that we would indeed
bring about many of the long sought reforms in the
procurement process. I expect to report the
following accomplishments when sunset comes in
1980. . .
"Full and effective implementation of OMB Circu-
lar A-109, which prescribes how major systems will
be acquired. Compliance with this Circular will be
achieved in the civil agencies as well as the
Defense Departments."
C. BUDGET EXECUTION AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL
The approved budget becomes the financial plan for the
operations of federal agencies during the fiscal year. Most
budget authority, and other budgetary resources, are made
available by OMB under an apportionment system that assures
the effective and orderly use of available authority.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 (88
STAT 297) provides that the executive branch may regulate
the rate of spending by deferring the availability of funds
to the approval of the Congress. Deferrals, which are tem-
porary withholdings of budget authority, cannot extend beyond
the end of the fiscal year and may be overturned by either
House of the Congress at any time. Recissions, which per-
manently cancel existing budget authority, must be enacted
by the full Congress.
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How will the advent of OMB Circular A-109 affect the
budget execution and expenditure control process? How
will related policy reforms such as Mission Area Budgeting
(MAB) and Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) impact the federal
budget process?
The Congressional Reform Act of 1974 requires Executive
Agencies to submit their budget requests in mission-oriented
terms, beginning with Fiscal 1979 submission, the current
budget. The procedures spelled out by the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 were designed to
give Congress a chance to weight the relative merits of
various spending programs and— if it chooses--to cut pro-
grams that it finds ineffective.
During this same period (early 19 7 0's) new policy was
being generated to serve as enforcement for regaining Congres-
sional control over the "uncontrollable" elements in the
budget without necessarily cutting popular programs. OMB
Circular A- 7 6 [Ref. 41] made it the policy of the government
to rely on the private sector for such goods as are commer-
cailly available. Circular A-76 was not taken seriously
until after Circular A-109 became executive policy in April
1976. Circular A-109 advocates a "systems approach"
emphasizing high-level approval of an agency's need prior to
the initiation of system development and production. Circu-
lar A-76 was re-emphasized, stating specific goals for the
kinds of activities to be contracted out, proportion of in-
house versus out-house activities, and comparison standards
for judging in-house versus out-house performance.
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The size and content of the defense budget is largely
determined by the President's budget. OMB is a staff arm
of the President to assist in the preparation of the budget,
to supervise and control budget execution and' to evaluate
federal program performance. A special relationship exists
for DOD in that budget estimates are reviewed jointly by
OMB and DOD while all other agencies present their budgets
for review by OMB and decision by the President.
Through the strict application of the OMB Circulars,
the executive branch (which largely controls the size of the
budget and the military mission emphasis) can also control
(.1) the budget portion spent in the private sector (Circular
A-76) and (2) the rate at which major procurements are ini-
tiated (Circular A-109) .
Circular A-109's application is minimal to the appropria-
tions bill (creation of obligational authority), the authori-
zation act (giving authority to purchase when Congress makes
dollars available) , and apportionment (allocation at the
agency level) except for the interest in the total dollars
available for major systems procurement. The FY-1978 Authori'
zation Bill (HR 5970) differs from the Appropriations Bill
(HR 7988) causing one of the few DOD designated A-109 pro-
grams (SIRCS) to receive opposing management directions, as
discussed later in Section VI.
It is likely that DOD will try to narrow the number of
mission categoreis to provide for transfer and reprogramming
flexibility when apportionment is by mission areas. The
Armed Service Committess, however, will probably continue to
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insist on a heavy line item breakdown of each mission area
project so that they can continue to micromanage. There is
some validity in their approach as detailed mission area
budgeting tends to break down service rivalry and redundancy.
Reprogramming is a non-statutory, low visibility budget
activity which does not involve OMB. Recent requirements on
required reprogramming approval, reporting and thresholds
might eventually lead to the application of Circular A-109
to reprogramming. However, the recent reprogramming activity
of the Senate Armed Services Committee allowed new program
starts that were solution-oriented as opposed to needs-
oriented. Even though the Senate Armed Services Committee
reoriented its Fiscal 1978 budget hearing format toward a
mission approach, this year Circular A-109 does not appear
to be applied to reprogramming in FY-1978. Yet, the Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman, Senator John L. McClellan,
would appear to be a proponent of Circular A-109, as shown
in Appendix K.
The DOD P lanning, Programming and Budgeting Ssytem (PPBS)
was the alternate to the massive reorganization of DOD by
President Kennedy. PPBS is considered to be the rational
approach to conducting DOD business - as opposed to the
political or organizational approach [Ref. 42]. Circular
A-109 is intended to improve the PPBS process by increasing
the early program efforts (such as requirements definition
and alternatives tradeoffs)
.
However, the incremental nature of the government budget-




and Circular A-109 will probably be confronted by a similar
unwillingness to make major changes.
Wildavsky argues "we have to be prepared to accept the
possibility that PPBS lacks necessary as well as sufficient
conditions, that its disabilities occur not merely in pro-
gram implementation but in policy design that, in a word,
its defects are defects in principle, not in execution....
PPBS sacrifices the rationality of ends to the rationality
of means; that is why seemingly rationale procedures produce
irrational results" [Ref. 44],
Circular A-109 strikes at the heart of this criticism of
PPBS "...Federal Agencies, when acquiring major systems,
will:
a) Express needs and program objectives in mission
terms and not equipment terms (solutions)
.
b) Place emphasis on the initial activities of the
system acquisition process to allow competitive
exploration of alternatives.
c) Communicate with Congress early in the system by
relating major systems acquisition (MSA) programs
to agency mission needs.
d) Establish clear lines of authority, responsibility,
and accountability for management of MSA programs.
e) Designate a focal point responsible for integrat-
ing and unifying the system acquisition management
process and monitoring policy implementation.
f) Rely on private industry in accordance with the
policy established by OMB Circular No. A-76" [Ref. 1
Note the primary requirement to state mission needs and
objectives in mission terms.
Issues '78, Perspectives on FY-78 Budget, states the
goals of OMB Circular A-113 as "integrating individual
72

department and agency management plans into the Federal Bud-
get process." Circular A-113 contained three substantially-
new elements which have been incorporated into department
and agency management plans [Ref . 45]
:
-A mission statement specifying agency missions and
relating them to missions of other agencies and
depar tmen ts
.
-An evaluation review statement calling for program
reviews to the budget cycle.
-A comprehensive management plan (goals, objectives
and supporting activities) to achieve short-run
objectives and overall goals.
The integration of management review of an agency's opera-
tions and activities with budgetary review of its requested
funds for future years is a major governmental change.
While preceding discussion concerned the intended de-
vices to identify needs and promote wise expenditure, the
executive budget enforcement and control technique is Zero
Based Budgeting (ZBB) . Peter Pyhrr, who is a principal pro-
ponent of ZBB, defines it as [Ref. 46]
:
"An operating, planning and budgetary process which
requires each manager to justify his entire budget
request in detail, and shifts the burden of proof
to each manager to justify why he should spend the
money. This procedure requires that all activities
and operations be identified in decision packages
which will be evaluated and ranked in order of
importance by systematic analysis."
The President can change the procedural documents like
OMB Circular A-ll [Ref. 47] and implement ZBB through 0MB
Bulletin 77-9 [Ref. 48] without Congressional approval.
Circular A-ll provides guidance to all Executive Agencies
on how to put their Fiscal Year 1979 budget requests together
including instructions reflecting both ZBB and mission
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budgeting doctrine. As the Honorable Lester Fettig, OFPP
Administrator, has stated [Ref. 49],
"A-ll links ZZB and Mission budgeting in a most cogent
fashion.
"
However, as it has been applied in three states, ZBB
would be primarily a management tool for program operators
(Congress and executive agency heads) rather than a policy
process for the Chief Executive. In this sense, ZBB is
oriented toward management rather than policy-making. The
common objectives and expectations fcr ZBB include:
-rational budget cuts
-better budget support information
-provide top management with better insight into
detailed organizational workings
-focus on organizational objectives
-integration of budgeting and operational management
and control
ZBB clearly can be a powerful tool to allow the Congress
to gain a measure of control over federal spending. It is
not entirely clear whether the Executive Branch or the
Congress would gain more power from the use of ZBB.
Mission Budgeting, in combination with Circular A-109,
will not only have a profound effect on whether systems re-
search, development and production funding requests are
approved but also holds the promise of major improvements
to the acquisition of major systems. As GAO pointed out in
its 27 July 1977 report, "Mission Budgeting" [Ref. 50], con-




-"Helping the President and Federal Agencies formulate
budgets according to end purposes, needs and priorities;
-"Strengthening Congressional policy review and
program oversight;
-"Achieving greater public accountability in the use
of Federal funds;
-"Providing one budget system oriented to both
Executive and Congressional needs;
-"Clarifying mission responsibilities of the Federal
Agencies and keeping them relevant to national policies
and ne eds
;
-"Serving as a structural foundation for 'zero-base'
and 'sunset', i.e., kill the program or even the agency,
reviews as well as governmental reorganization."
Figures 7, 8, and 9 illustrate how GAO envisions Mission
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Figure 7, using the mission approach, shows how a typi-
cal budget request would be broken down into missions, mis-
sion areas, mission needs and finally to different projects
within a program.
In Figures 8 and 9, the current approach of traditional
DOD budgets is contrasted with the Mission approach proposed
by Circular A-109.
Many OMB circulars and implementing directives are com-
panion to the Circular A-109. This theme is being approached
from many directions, the main theme being, in the author's
opinion, we have got to straighten up our act and show we
can conduct a meaningful acquisition process before constit-
uent pressure becomes directly opposed as to how we spend
the tax dollars.
A joint House-Senate Conference Report on Defense appro-
priations for Fiscal Year 197 3 " emphas i zed that the Depart-
ment of Defense should adhere to OMB Circular A-109, and
future funding of new programs will be contingent on compli-
ance" [Ref . 51] . Mr. Fred Dietrich, Assistant Administrator
for System Acquisition, OFPP , stated in Ref. 52, "Right at
the leading edge of A-109 is Mission Budgeting."
D. POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS FOR CIRCULAR A-109
With any new innovative policy comes new problems which,
if not recognized and controlled, can deter what would other-
wise be significant and important changes. The Major System
development process within the Executive Branch operates an
environment containing unique problems. It is within these
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problem areas that Circular A-109 must operate if implementa-
tion is to be successful.
A unique problem area for Circular A-109 implementation
in the Federal agencies is the budgeting environment involv-
ing Congress. Congressmen, accustomed to looking only at
budget line items of projects in which they have a special
interest, are going to have to step back and evaluate whether
or not whole programs are worth doing. This preoccupation
with budget line items combined with large volumes of justi-
fication data containing technical details has involved Con-
gress in micromanagemen t of individual programs. The result
has been a Congressional distraction away from more funda-
mental mission need problems and issues. In effect, "the
back end of the problem has been studied to death while the
front end has been largely ignored" [Ref . 49]
.
But there are signs that Congress is in the process of
accepting Circular A-109. Senator John McClellan, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has already requested
and received a detailed report from DOD on some 32 DOD
major system acquisition programs and their Circular A-109
implementation status, as given in Appendix H. Senator
Lawton Chiles has made it clear that he will support programs
which follow Circular A-109 principles and intends "to take
a run at any which don't." As discussed earlier, GAO has
ruled that Circular A-109 has the effect of law unless coun-
termanded on a program by program basis by Congress. As
Circular A-109 advocates on Capital Hill are beginning to
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make clear, the only way their colleagues can by-pass Circu-
lar A-109 philosophies on specific programs is to pass a
law requiring the exception each time, and "They can't keep
doing that to us forever" [Ref. 53].
The Executive agencies, themselves, will also have to re-
orient their budget requests and reviews from line items to
mission areas. The initial reaction from the agencies ranged
from, "That's not applicable to us," to "We already do that."
According to Mr. Fred Dietrich, OFPP, as the Fiscal 1979
budget requests are submitted to OMB, agencies which do not
think Circular A-109 applies are going to find out that it
does and program managers who think they already follow Cir-
cular A-109 though in different form are going to find out
they do not. Some key agency officials who have not made up
their minds about Circular A-109 are going to learn they must
comply if their programs are to be funded. OMB budget
examiners will be working closely with OFPP to assure com-
pliance with Circular A-109. Senator Law ton Chiles has
noted [Ref. 49] :
"Agencies traditionally have come in only to justify
new dollars. Nobody comes back to justify the first
dollar. That is what zero-based budgeting will re-
quire. I don't know how you do that properly unless
you already know what the mission is. And, in the
present line-item budget approach to the budget, you
don't get those mission descriptions."
Mr. Lester Fettig has commented, "A-109 can't force re-
J
form in system acquisition thinking. It has come from the
Budget Reform Act, from mission oriented budgeting. The
agencies have to begin to orient their thinking to mission
needs at the R and D stage" [Ref. 54].
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Another budgeting problem is that Circular A-109 compli-
ance requires a fiscal commitment to a program before the
system hardware is defined. In the front-end (prior to key
decision point 3) of the life-cycle of a program, proprietary
information of competing concept system designs limits dis-
closure of those concepts and hardware which in turn causes
difficulty for agencies and program managers in justifying
and defending their budgets. Program managers will have to
resist the pressure to make a premature commitment among the
concept alternatives in return for a commitment in funds for
their program. The Commission on Government Procurement
(COGP) recognized this problem when it stated [Ref . 2] :
To explore different system concepts and introduce
a competitive development requires R&D money of a
scale usually not made available until a decision
has been reached that a given system approach should
be pursued, something of a paradox.
The proprietary nature of the source selection process from
the first Request for Proposal (RFP) to the selection of a
single producer is necessary in order to avoid inadvertent
technical transfusion of system designs and unwanted solu-
tions. In order to realize the long term benefits of the
Circular A-109 approach, program managers must resist the
pressures for a premature commitment to saleable but non-
viable systems. The long term benefits of competition will
be difficult to quantify in requesting funding in the near
term.
During the early life cycle phases, particularly the
Exploration of Alternatives Systems, a closer government and
industry liaison is required under Circular A-109. This
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liaison must be controlled to prevent inadvertent slips of
information that could result in technical transfusion of
design feature and could also give unfair advantage to one
or more of the competing contractors. The transfer of
technology base knowledge to contractors during the Explora-
tion of Alternatives Phase will require larger amounts of
Government Furnished Information (GFI) which may result in
additional cost for the program.
With Circular A-109, the prohibition of technical trans-
fusion particularly in the Exploration of Alternatives Phase
may cause an increase in time and resources spent in the
front-end source selection. The parallel competition and
the periodic source selections will create a continuous
source selection process. Each decision to continue or drop
a competing contractor will become a source selection deci-
sion. For major system programs, such decisions will have
an important impact on the competing contractors. This may
be a counter-productive effect of Circular A-109 with con-
tractors minimizing exploration of alternative concepts be-
cause of the time, expense and effort associated with the
source selection process.
The exploration of alternative concepts may likely in-
crease the research and development (R&D) cost for a major
system program. Circular A-109 requires an expanded front-
end effort. Without adequate budgetary support, the base of
alternative concepts will be artificially constrained, forc-
ing a limit in the number of concept study contracts awarded

Not only will the government have to reorient its R and D
cost structure, but the manner and level with which contrac-
tors expend independent research and development (IR&D) funds
may have to be reorganized. The internal funding of con-
tractors for the front-end competition must be rechanneled
in response to the required documented studies of mission
need. The traditional arrangements of cost-sharing of
front-end processes by the contractor must be revamped.
Mr. Lester Fettig, Administrator for OFPP , in a recent
interview [Ref. 54] challenged the notion that there is a
potential problem of increased cost and time in the front
end of a major system program complying with Circular A-109.
Mr. Fettig contends that the funds for the increased front-
end requirements of Circular A-109 have always been and are
presently available to the programs. He argues that the
money is now hidden in the present contracts and that what
Circular A-109 proposes is to more clearly identify those
funds as R and D monies. In response to Circular A-109
lengthening of the life cycle, Mr. Fettig maintains that the
" new" activi ties have always gone on but in an undisciplined,
unstructured manner. Circular A-109 will structure the pro-
cedure and will allow competition to be the pacing factor in
the front-end process and the total life cycle to be short-
ened
.
One potential problem for which program managers must be
alert is to ensure innovation in response to the concept
proposals. The traditional contractor approach of proposing
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the more marketable "Give the customer what he wants," in-
stead "what he needs" must be discouraged. Also "Contrac-
tors v/ith a solution looking for a need" must be controlled.
Finally, Circular A-109 has a potential problem of estab-
lishing too tight cost bounds prior to hardware definitions.
Circular A-109 requires that program cost objectives be in-
cluded in the initial mission need solicitation. The number
of units to be produced is one of the most significant deter-
minants of the total program cost and this determinant is
most likely unknown to the program manager during the initial
phase of the program. Without hardware definition, a pro-
gram manager can only talk about af f ordabi li ty projections
for a required capability. Full implementation of Circular
A-109 and a re-orientation to mission area budgeting should




IV. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION
OF CIRCULAR A-109
In this section, the imapct of the issuance of key DOD
policy documents in compliance with Circular A-109 is exam-
ined; in particular, DOD Directives 5000.1 [Ref. 5], 5000.2
[Ref. 6] and 500.30 [Ref. 7]. The resulting DOD policy and
organization changes to the Major System Acquisition process
are analyzed, especially the creation of the Defense Acquisi-
tion Executive, the changes to the front-end of the Major
System Acquisition Life Cycle and the decentralization in
decision making. The status of DOD implementation is inves-
tigated through discussions of DOD's submission of implemen-
tation plan to OMB/OFPP, a brief look at DOD components'
preparation of internal policies and procedures and explora-
tion of Congressional interest in DOD implementation.
A. KEY PERSONNEL AND POLICY DOCUMENTS
0MB Circular A-109 has made a major policy impact on DOD
in the area of material acquisition. DOD has a key leader-
ship role in the Federal agencies' implementation of Circu-
lar A-109. DOD was the first Federal agency to submit Cir-
cular A-109 implementation plans to OMB/OFPP in August 1976.
During the formulation of Circular A-109, there was extensive
interaction between OFPP and DOD, particularly the Director
Defense Research and Engineering (DDRSE) regarding system
acquisition format and structure [Ref. 3]. This interaction
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continued after the issuance of Circular A-109 with the re-
writing of key DOD policy documents. Circular A-109 has re-
ceived top level DOD attention and implementation has con-
tinued with the change in the Administration in January 1977
and the subsequent reorganization and reas signments within
DOD .
The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Material Acquisition) , has stated in a re-
cent article [Ref . 55]
:
"About 70 percent of our total weapon system
acquisition and support costs are essentially
determined during the conceptual stages of equip-
ment development. Because of this it is impera-
tive that the necessary kind of attention be
focused at the front end of the process, to reduce
'downstream costs'...
"More attention is being given to the initial
stages of the acquisition process. As directed
by OMB Circular A-109, entitled 'Major System
Acquisitions, 1 the mission need is evaluated more
critically and a wider range of available tech-
nologies to meet that need, quickly and efficiently
- are considered both in terms of performance and
life-cycle costs...
"Historically, the length of the acquisition cycle
has been perturbated by two things - first, dis-
agreement on what is wanted, and second, the ten-
dency to bite off a larger technological chunk than
we are capable of digesting. Circular A-109 forces
us to resolve the first item, and Secretary Brown's
recent polciy statements emphasizing simplicity and
reliability as weapon goals requires us to face
squarely the second. Given these two steps, the
decision process must be revised to take advantage
of the potential for more rapid developments."
Even though some delay has been experienced in complet-
ing actions at the component (Service) level, new policies
for initiation of new programs are now in effect. There




The first of these documents is DOD Directive 5000.30,
"Defense Acquisition Executive", [Ref. 7] which was issued on
August 20, 1976. This document establishes the new organi-
zational position within the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense (OSD) of Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). The DAE,
discussed later in this section, is now the principal advisor
and staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for
the acquisition of defense systems.
The Honorable Dale W. Church, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition Policy) stated the following in an
address at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School [Ref. 56]
:
"The reorganization of the Office of the
Defense now being imp lemented . . . was moti
large extent by the policy promulgated i
Circular A-109 which among other things
executive departments and agencies to co
major responsibility for systems acquisi
a single departmental authority or acqui
DOD research, engineering and acquisitio
has been consolidated under an Under Sec
Defense for Research and Engineering and
Dr. William Perry, has been designated t
tion Executive. To carry out his functi
has given each of his Deputy Under Secre
additional responsibility for the produc
weapon systems acquisitions, thereby int
the research and development function th
production activities previously carried
I & L organization. My position as the
Secretary for Acquisition Policy was ere
solidate all of the acquisition policy f
including procurement, production and st
...I believe the close relationships ere
reorganization among all the elements in
acquisition at the OSD level will have a
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The second and third key documents were approved by for'
mer Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements on
January 18, 1977. DOD Directive 5000.1, "Major System
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Acquisitions" [Ref . 5] , redefines a major system and estab-
lishes the major milestones and phases of defense acquisi-
tion systems. DOD Directive 5000.2, "Major System Acquisi-
tion Process" [Ref. 6] establishes the Mission Element Meed
Statement (MENS) and the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP)
as the decision recording documents. DOD Directive 5000.2
also re-establishes the Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) , and in certain cases the (Service) Systems
Acquisition Review Council (S) (SARC) , as the decision review
body .
These key DOD documents replace the previous DOD Direc-
tive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems," December
22, 1975, DOD Instruction 5000.2, "DOD DCP and DSARC",
January 21, 1975 and DOD Directive 5000.25, "DSARC", January
21, 1975.
B. CHANGES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACQUISITION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
The major impact of principal changes in the new key DOD
Directives has been in three areas of the DOD Major System
Acquisition process. These three areas are:
-New organizational positions and roles with the
establishment of the Defense Acquisition Executive
and the clarification of the program manager's
function
.
-Restructuring the "Front-end" of the DOD Acquisi-
tion Life Cycle with the requirement that needs
rather than hardware systems be identified at the
start of a new acquisition system by means of the
MENS .
-Movement toward decentralization of decision-making
by the establishment of (Service) System Acquisition




1 . New Organizational Positions and Roles
The first area of principal change is in the new or-
ganizational positions and roles. DOD Directive 5000.30
[Ref. V] establishes the charter for the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) . The DAE has a key DOD position as the prin-
cipal advisor and staff assistant to the SECDEF for the
acquisition of defense systems and equipment. The DAE is
the focal point in management of the Major System Acquisi-
tion process and performs the following functions:
(1) Integrates and unifies the management process,
policies and procedures for defense system acquisi-
tion .
(2) Monitors the implementation of the policies and
practices in OFPP Circular A-109 and in the system
acquisition policies of the SECDEF.
(3) Coordinates the development of acquisition invest-
ment planning for the DOD to assure the continuity
of decisions among various life cycle phases.
(4) Serves as Chairman of the DSARC.
(5) Advises the SECDEF on the timing of program manager
assignment, on the adequacy of the program manage-
ment structure and on the quality of the program
management achieved.
In addition, the DAE:
(1) Coordinates the actions of the various OSD offices
as they carry out their assigned responsibilities
in major weapon system acquisition.
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(2) Coordinates actions with the DOD Components that
have collateral or related functions.
(3) Maintains active liaison for the exchange of in-
formation and advice with the DOD Components.
(4) Consults with the Joint Chief of Staff on the in-
teraction of system acquisition with operational
strategy
.
(5) Maintains active liaison with the OFPP in matters
concerning system acquisition policy.
(6) Promotes the maintenance of active liaison with
appropriate R&D, system design, procurement, logis-
tic and environmental service agencies outside the
DOD, including private business, educational or
research institutions or other agencies of the
government
.
Previous to Circular A-109, neither DOD nor the Ser-
vices had an acquisition executive. The responsibility for
making policy and monitoring acquisition programs had been
split between the technical, logistics and business functions
at top DOD and individual Service levels. This split in
authority between the R&D and procurement policy staff func-
tions made it difficult to correlate changes in acquisition
policies, monitor implementation of the separate policies,
or determine the ultimate results of the policies.
Before, the Director, Defense Research and Engineer-
ing, (DDR&E) developed overall acquisition policies and the




(ASD(ISL)), issued policy in the form of regulations. These
regulations set policy for all DOD procurement including
some aspects of major system contracting. The acquisition
policy for program implementation was split between ASPR and
DOD directives and this split existed in the monitoring and
the DSARC decision process. DDR&E chaired DSARC I and II and
ASD(ISL) was the chairman of DSARC III. As a result of this
split, the problem of discontinuity existed and there was
duplication of responsibilities, layering and management
overstaffing which occur below the top levels of DOD and Ser-
vice components.
The establishment of the DAE to have overall responsi-
bility for coordination of acquisition policy should act to
unify the DDR&E and ASD(ISL) roles in the acquisition process.
The SECDEF designated Dr. William J. Perry, then
Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) , as the
DAE.
Although the Program Manager's organizational position
has not been changed, his function and authority has been
further strengthened through restatement in the new Direc-
tives. The Program Manager retains a key management role
in DOD. Assignment of the Program Manager is now required
to be made following the first SECDEF decision point (Mile-
stone 0) . The tenure for a Program Manager is more expli-
citly stated. For example, following his assignment at the
first SECDEF decision point, the Program Manager shall not
normally be relieved until after the second SECDEF decision
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point. The varying talents required of a Program Manager
for different program phases are now called for in the con-
sideration and selection of Program Managers. The impact
of the line and staff elements upon the Program Manager has
been discussed before in the Acquisition Advisory Group
(AAG) Report [Ref. 57], the Army and the Navy Material Ac-
quisition Review Committees (AMARC & NMARC) [Refs. 16 and 17].
The restatement of the Program Manager's function and author-
ity in the new Directives is to reduce the program perturba-
tions by line and staff elements at whatever level they re-
side. Now decisions by line officials above the Program
Manager that direct or cause program changes must be docu-
mented. This could prove to be one of the more controversial
changes in the new Directives.
The new Directives also call for a change in the tra-
ditional organizational roles. A simplified interpretation
of the redefinition of the roles of the various organizations
involved in the DOD Major Systems Acquisition process is
given in Figure 10. The DOD components (Services) must re-
orient their traditional roles as product or hardware advo-
cates and begin to identify and articulate needs based upon
mission deficiencies. This will be a significant change for
the Services and their solution-oriented organizations.
The government laboratories have traditionally been
involved in defining hardware solutions to be produced by in-
dustry. Now the laboratories are tasked to develop and
maintain a technology base in support of their service's
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assisting in the evaluation of system alternatives to be pro-
posed by industry. The OSD, instead of merely approving or
disapproving specific hardware solutions, will now review
and approve the basic mission needs as well at each key deci-
sion point (Milestone)
.
As discussed in Section III, the Congressional role
should shift from the micromanagemen t of specific program
through detail review of individual budget line items to the
higher order function of authorization and appropriation of
budget requests on an agency need basis; involving Congress
with the threat, mission deficiencies and program purpose
and goals. Industry, instead of being constrained to respond
to rigid hardware specifications, will now be asked to re-
spond to a broad statement of mission need. The alternative
system design concept responses of the competing industry
contractors will be evaluated to identify those solutions
that satisfy the approved mission need. The improvements
in the DOD Major System Acquisition process called for by
Circular A-109 can not occur without implementation of these
redefinitions of organizational roles.
2 . Restructuring of the Front-End Process
The second major area of change resulting from the
issuance of the new DOD Directives implementing Circular
A-109 is the restructuring of the "front-end" of the DOD
Major System Acquisition process. As Mr. Dale Church stated
in Ref . 56
:
"One of our DOD policies and actions to improve the
acquisition process... we are giving much more attention
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The area of major change in DOD covers activities prior to
Full-Scale Engineering Development Phase. The new DOD
Directives add a new SECDEF decision point, Milestone 0,
for program initiation. The four key agency head decision
points called for in Circular A-109 have now been incor-
porated as the four key SECDEF decision points called for
in the new DOD Directives and are presented in Table III.
TABLE III
Circular A-109 SECDEF
Decision Points Decision Points Designation
1 Milestone Program
Initiation
2 Milestone I Demons tra t ion
(DSARC I) and Validation
3 Mi les tone II Full Scale
(DSARC II) Engineering
Deve lopment
4 Miles tone III Production and
(DSARC III) Dep loyment
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These four key SECDEF decision points are overlaid
on the Circular A-109 Major System Acquisition Cycle in
Figure 11 , [Ref . 4]
.
The Pre-Mi les tone activities are concerned with
mission area analysis in the various segments of the Defense
mission. This evaluation may be a service initiative as a
result of a perceived deficiency or threat or may be reques-
ted by SECDEF. The analysis of the mission areas will
identify mission needs and state those needs in terms of
operational tasks to be accomplished rather than in terms
of hardware performance or characteristics. After this
analysis identifies a mission element need, the service
will prepare the Milestone decision recording document,
a Mission Element Need Statement (MENS)
.
The MENS is a new document for DOD , established in
the new DOD Directive 5000.2, and corresponds directly with
Circular A-109's Mission Need Statement. The MENS, limited
to ten pages, is used to describe a mission and justify the
initiation of a new Major System Acquisition.
First, the MENS presents mission information by
identifying the mission area, by describing the need and
mission element in terms of the job to be done in a speci-
fied time period, and by defining the threat situation in-
cluding quantified threat data in types, numbers and capa-
bilities and source of intelligence information. Second,
the existing DOD capabilities to accomplish the mission are
evaluated, not from a single service view, but from a
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Fig. 11 [REF. 4]
96

summary of DOD and allied capability. Also, the cost to
acquire and operate the existing DOD capability is included.
Third, the assessment of the mission need is pre-
sented in terms of a deficiency in the existing capability,
a projected physical obsolescence or a technological or cost
savings opportunity. Next, the known constraints are stated
as they apply to any alternative solutions including cost
limits placed on investment to acquire the solution needed
(not a cost estimate) , limits placed on operating cost over
the life of the system, operational and logistics considera-
tions, manpower factors, requirements for NATO standardiza-
tion and interoperability, and timing of need (all of which
are considered as boundary conditions for the exploration of
acceptable solutions) . Then, the impact of staying with the
present capability and not acquiring a new solution is
assessed from operational, logistics and cost points of view.
Finally, in the MENS, the program plan to identify
and explore competitive alternative systems extending through
to Milestone I is provided. This plan includes the assign-
ment of the Program Manager, establishing whether the system
program office will be single or joint service, the projected
program manpower, funding and schedule through to Milestone
I, the approach to solicitation for alternative design con-
cepts and to contracting, and the potential areas of technology
to be explored, if known.
A proposed Mission Element Need Statement outline
is presented in Appendix I.
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The Milestone decision point is reached with the
submission by the Services of the MENS to SECDEF. Milestone
activities do not involve a DSARC review. Rather, the
Service Secretary, working through the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE) , coordinates with the OSD staff and the
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and submits a
coordinated package containing the MENS, OSD comments and
a proposed action memorandum to the SECDEF for approval.
In order for the program to proceed further, the SECDEF must
approve the mission need and the reconciliation of this need
with existing DOD capabilities, priorities and resources.
The SECDEF also establishes program constraints at this time.
The SECDEF ' s approval of the MENS gives direction to one or
more services to proceed with the identification and explora-
tion of alternative systems to respond to the need outlined
in the MENS.
Immediately following the SECDEF ' s approval of the
MENS at Milestone 0, the Conceptual Phase is entered and
the Services will assign a Program Manager who will then de-
velop the program's acquisition strategy. The Program
Manager will conduct a broad base competition for alternative
concept solutions in response to the mission need. During
the solicitation segment of the Conceptual Phase, competent
industry and educational institutions will identify and ex-
plore solution concepts through the use of parallel, short-
term system design concept contracts. During the evaluation
segment of the Conceptual Phase, government in-house
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technical organizations (such as government laboratories)
will analyze the candidate solution responses and their
characteristics, such as estimated cost, schedule, perform-
ance and support parameters and concepts. Upon selection
of the preferred alternative design concepts and competing
contractors by the Source Selection Evaluation Board, the
Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) is prepared by the Ser-
vices and coordinated with the DAE and OSD. The detailed
contents of a DCP is given in Ref. 6. As stated by Mr.
Dale Church in Ref. 56:
"The new source selection directive is a major step
toward improving our way of doing business with in-
dustry while lowering the cost of acquisition and
ownership. It directs that development awards will
be made based upon the inherent production and sup-
port costs of the proposed system— not primarily on
the proposed development program cost. The directive
recognizes that even though we in the Department of
Defense have the responsibility to provide the 're-
quirements' framework for our new systems, industry's
hands can't be tied if we truly want lower cost sys-
tems. Therefore we encourage contract change recom-
mendations (even during the bidding process) if they
are cost effective. The new source selection direc-
tive also establishes a test of the four-step source
selection process which is designed to improve the
quality of the process and to eliminate or reduce
program technical leveling, buy-ins and auctioning.
Seventeen service programs are being used in this
test which is scheduled for completion by 31 December
19 7 7."
Once the DCP has been prepared and submitted, the
Milestone I (Demonstration and Validation) decision point
is reached. The program review process begins with an
evaluation of the DCP by the Service System Acquisition
Review Council ((S)SARC) and the Service Secretary. If
agreement is reached, the DCP is sent to the Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) for review and referral
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to SECDEF if so designated. One change to the DSARC I pro-
cedure is the recommendation made by the DSARC as to whether
the DSARC should continue to review the program at future
Milestones or whether the (S)SARC should act for the DSARC.
The results and recommendations of the DSARC are then for-
warded to the SECDEF. If SECDEF is in agreement with the
DSARC finding, he reaffirms the mission need and signs the
DCP giving the Service(s) approval to carry the program in-
to the Demonstration and Validation Phase.
During the Demonstration and Validation Phase, the
program office will again use short-term, parallel contracts
to refine the selected alternatives through extensive study
and analyses, hardware development, test and evaluations.
The objective in the phase is to reduce technical risk,
validate the selected solutions and provide the basis for
determining whether or not to proceed to Full-Scale Engi-
neering Development Phase.
Beginning with the Milestone II (Full-Scale Engi-
neering Development) decision point, the specified phases
of program activity and decision points remain much the
same as prescribed by previous policy guidance. A detailed
explanation of the remaining phases and decision points is
given in Ref. 6. Figure 12 depicts the DOD Major System
Acquisition process with the front-end changes called for
in the new DOD Directives.
3 . Decentralization
One of the most significant opportunities for change







































































































































A-109 is the potential for decentralization of the DOD re-
view functions. The need for decentralization in decision-
making has been a continuing issue in DOD. The current
thrust for decentralization is an outgrowth of various Ser-
vice and OSD studies [Refs. 15, 16, and 57] , and a simple
need to reduce the load on the Program Manager of too many-
program reviews. There are three areas where decentraliza-
tion can now be accomplished.
First, the potential for increased decentralized
management is promoted by the formalization of the Service
System Acquisition Review Councils ((S)SARC) as an acknow-
ledged review council. Chaired by the Service Secretary or
Under Secretary and similar in composition and operation to
the DSARC, the (S)SARC's will review all Major System Ac-
quisition programs at Milestone I, II and III. The (S)SARC
review results and DCP will then be made available to the
Service Secretary for his submission to the DAE, Chairman
of the DSARC, for DSARC action or directly to SECDEF at
Milestone II and III for those selected programs for which
DSARC reviews have been waived by the SECDEF. Additionally,
there is a proposed provision for a waiver by SECDEF of DSARC
review for any program at any Milestone point. The poten-
tial of limiting the number of DSARC reviews through
reliance on the Service Secretary and (S)SARC management
activities can greatly contribute to decentralization of
Major System Acquisition management.
Second, there is now a formal requirement for a
Service and OSD planning meeting prior to preparing a DCP
102

for a Milestone decision. The Service will now issue the
"For Comment" and "For Coordination" drafts of the DCP to
OSD. After the development of the basic DCP draft, OSC in-
puts are now formally solicited and provided through a single
focal point, the DAE, prior to the (S)SARC. Over the past
several years, the DCP process has been severely stagnated
on both sides of the Service and OSC interface with the re-
sult that it has been necessary to engage top level princi-
pals to stimulate the process into functioning. One of the
DAE ' s most useful functions will be in the filtering of OSD
comments and issues in response to a Service "For Comment"
circulation of a DCP. This should help to minimize new major
program issues being raised in the DSARC forum. These ac-
tions will require a thorough preparation by the Services
prior to a Milestone decision point and will require OSC to
formally raise issues with the Services prior to making their
program recommendations to the SECDEF. Thus, the Service
Secretary should now have the same set of inputs as does the
SECDEF, making his recommendations to SECDEF more knowledge-
able, stronger and influential. The net effect can be
decentralized program management for the Services with
greater internal program control and less external perturba-
tion
.
Third, as discussed previously, the strengthening of
the designated Program Manager's authority to achieve a set
of approved program objectives within documented and agreed-
upon constraints could enhance the movement toward decentrali-





C. STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
The Department of Defense was the first of the 19 Federal
agencies to submit Circular A-109 implementation plans to OMB
and OFPP in August 1976. In an interview [Ref . 52] , Mr. Fred
Dietrich, OFPP, stated that, while DOD's implementation plan
was "responsive", he felt it was "incomplete" for two reasons.
First, "the plan did not describe how the implementing in-
structions would cascade down through the Services to the
command organizations and to the field activities. Just
issuances of directives is not implementation." Second,
there was "no provision to train and orient people down at
the field level. Some people feel that is why the old 5000.1
and 5000.2 are not fully implemented today." Mr. Dietrich
stated that while he was "not fully happy" with the two DOD
documents, (the new DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2), they
were responsive and he felt that "it was better to issue them
than to wait." He also stated that it might have been better
to "just reference Circular A-109 and talk about how to
manage and staff within the Agencies. This is what some
Federal Agencies have done."
On January 18, 1977, DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2
[Refs. 5 and 6] were issued. Subsequent changes to remain-
ing policy documents concerned with DOD Major System Acquisi-
tion are in process. Training programs are in the process
of being established to familiarize DOD personnel with
Circular A-109.
Top level DOD managers already require that a MENS will
be prepared for selected programs and that all new Major
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System programs will follow Milestone procedures. The
Congressional interest in thepresent status of these pro-
grams is given in Appendix H and J.
As stated in Section IV. A., Dr. William J. Perry, the
new Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
remains the designated DAE. Dr. Perry served as the first
DAE, as specified in DOD Directive 5000.30 [Ref. 7], in his
old position as Director, Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E)
.
The Honorable Dale Church in a recent interview [Ref.
60] stated that his office was in the process of updating
and combining the new DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2
[Refs. 5 and 6] into one document. Mr. Church said that at
this time he had no proposed date for issuance.
While all of the implementation discussion has centered
on "Major" systems, it should be noted that the DOD Direc-
tives apply to all systems acquisitions. As noted in para-
graph II. B. of DOD Directive 5000.1 [Ref. 5] , "the manage-
ment of systems programs not designated as major systems
acquisitions will be guided by the provisions of this Direc-
tive." The Program Memorandum, which was previously used to
support OSD review and decision-making process for "non-
Major" systems, is not mentioned in the new DOD Directives.
The Program Memorandum was essentially the same as the DCP
but was used for programs which though important may not
have fully met the criteria of the old DOD Directive 5000.1
as a Major program warranting a DCP. Not only is Program
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Memorandum not mentioned in the new DOD Directives but no
new directives have been issued to cover the use of the
Program Memorandum.
The Services are in the process of preparing internal
policies and procedures implementing DOD Directives 5000.1
and 5000.2. At the present time, the Navy's SECNAVINST
5000.2, the Army's AR 1000-2, and the Air Force's AFR 800-2
are all being rewritten. Once these regulations and instruc-
tions are reviewed and approved, the next level of regula-
tions and instructions must be updated. Early Winter 1977
is now forecast to be the earliest date of issuance of these
documents
.
The Service System Acquisition Review Councils ((S)SARC),
although established prior to the issuance of DOD Directive
5000.2 [Ref . 6] , are formally implemented in the DOD Major
System Acquisition process. Previous Service instructions
and regulations (Navy's SECNAVINST 5420. 127A, Army's AR 15-14,
and Air Force's SAF Order 20.6) are now expected to be up-
dated to conform to Ref. 6.
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V. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY IMPLEMENTATION
OF CIRCULAR A-109
In this section, the impact of Circular A-109 implemen-
tation within the Department of the Navy is examined. The
Navy's organizational structure for system acquisition is
presented. The resulting changes of the new DOD Directives
[Refs. 5 and 6] to Navy acquisition policy and procedures
is investigated along with the incorporation of these changes
A. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR ACQUISITION
The acquisition management structure of the Office of
the Secretary of the Navy (OSN) is similar in organization
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) discussed in
Section IV. The component head is the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV), the Honorable W. Graham Claytor, Jr. He has over-
all responsibility and control for the acquisition policies
of the Navy. Assisting the SECNAV in acquisition management
are two Navy Acquisition Executives (NAE) whose functions
are similar to those of the Defense Acquisition Executive
(DAE) discussed in Section IV. The Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) , the
Honorable Edward Hidalgo, is responsible for the coordina-
tion of ship acquisition programs while the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy (Research, Engineering and Systems) , the
Honorable David E. Mann, is responsible for the coordination
of all other Navy acquisition programs.
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The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps (CMC) are responsible for identifying
operational needs and for determining characteristics and
defining requirements to meet their respective needs. The
CNO and the CMC, along with the appropriate Navy Acquisition
Executive, are responsible for advising SECNAV with respect
to Milestone decision points and management of Major System
Acquisition programs. The CMC is authorized program manage-
ment responsibility for systems developed by or produced for
Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC). Provisions for transi-
tion of program management authority for systems developed
and procured jointly by the HQMC and the Naval Material Com-
mand (NMC) are determined by joint agreement between the CMC
and the Chief of Naval Material (CNM)
.
The CNM, under the CNO, is assigned the responsibility
for the establishment, application and execution of program
management within the Navy. While large programs (such as
programs which involve more than one major area of naval
warfare) report directly to CNM, other programs as designated
by CNM, report to the Commanders of the Systems Commands (Sea,
Electronic and Air) . Upon chartering and designation, a
Program Manager is responsible for the formulation and execu-
tion of plans for his specific program's system development
and production. Organizational interrelationships are
specified in each individual charter.
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B. ANTICIPATED CHANGES TO DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
ACQUISITION POLICY AND PROCEDURE
Navy implementation of the new DOD Directives [Refs. 5
and 6] will be set forth in the anticipated reissuance of
the SECNAV Instruction 5000.1, "System Acquisition in the
Department of the Navy" and the CNO Instruction 5000.42,
"Weapon System Selection and Planning". The changes in
policy, management and procedural guidance for Major System
Acquisition contained in the new DOD Directives appear to
be compatible with the present Navy acquisition process.
The three areas of principal change proposed in the new DOD
Directives and discussed in Section IV. B. (new organiza-
tional positions and roles, restructuring the front end of
the life cycle, movement toward decentralization in program
review functioning) have in part already been incorporated
in the Navy and in part are anticipated in the reissuance of
SECNAV Instruction 5000.1 [Ref. 61] and CNO Instruction
5000 . 42A [Ref. 62] .
1 . Organizational Positions and Roles
In the first area of principal change, new organiza-
tional positions and roles, the Navy has established the new
position of Navy Acquisition Executive (NAE) as discussed
earlier in this Section. The two NAE ' s are an effective
focal point for the Major System Acquisition process within
the Navy. As discussed later in this section, the NAE co-
ordinates the various acquisition boards and documents, in
particular the Navy Decision Coordinating Paper (NDCP) and
the Navy System Acquisition Review Council (DNSARC) , and
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filters SECNAV comments and responses to the Office of CNO
(OPNAV) and the Offxce of CNM (NAVMAT). Additionally, the
NAE assists his DOD counterpart, the DAE, in feeding back
OSD comments in response to a Navy "For Comment" circulation
of a DCP . The NAE should serve as an effective buffer for
OPNAV and NAVMAT against unexpected perturbations in the
DNSARC and DSARC forums
.
Additionally, the NAE should assist the Navy in im-
plementing the new budgeting requirements of new DOD Direc-
tives. Now, Planning/Programming/Budgeting System (PPBS)
actions which change documented SECDEF program decisions
for Navy programs will have to be coordinated through the
NAE and DAE. This does not mean that there will not be vari-
ations in the funding schedule as proposed in the DCP as
long as such variations can be accomplished by the Program
Manager without threshold breaches. Major changes in program
funding schedule cannot be made without advising and consult-
ing the SECDEF. This NAE and DAE coordination should reduce
the incidence of staff PPBS action which change SECDEF deci-
sions and should contribute to Navy program stability.
The line authority for Navy Program Managers dis-
cussed in the new DOD Directives, is expected to be reempha-
sized in the anticipated Navy Instructions. Previous program
perturbations caused by non-line elements (OSD, OPNAV and
NAVMAT staff elements) may be expected to be reduced. Only
through an awareness and enforcement of this policy by all
Navy elements will this proposed change be implemented.
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With his designation immediately after Milestone 0,
the Navy Program Manager will be the focal point for the
program particularly during the Solicitation and Evaluation
segments of the Conceptual Phase. The Program Manager will
have to interface with OPNAV, NAVMAT and the Navy labora-
tories in developing and exploring alternative solutions.
Another requirement for the Program Manager will be the
initiation of action in reporting program variances (breaches
or threatened breaches to thresholds or constraints) . This
action is to be initiated immediately upon occurrence instead
of waiting for the DSARC forum.
The new organizational roles of OPNAV as discussed
in Section IV. B. of identifying and articulating mission
deficiencies vice being strictly hardware advocates could
prove to be difficult to implement. Presently, both OPNAV
and NAVMAT with its Systems Commands and government labora-
tories are organized along hardware or platform (Air, Surface,
Sub-surface, Electronics) lines rather than mission areas
(Sea Control, etc.) . Some OSD officials have recently ex-
pressed doubts that the Navy can effectively implement this
change based upon the present OPNAV and NAVMAT organizational
structure [Ref. 60].
2 . Restructuring of the Front-End Process
In the second area of principal change, restructuring \/
of the front-end of the acquisition life cycle, implementa-
tion can be accomplished by modifications to the present
Navy Major System Acquisition process. Identification of
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Navy mission area needs is compatible with the existing
issuances of the Operational Requirement (OR) document.
Bot h the '^Technology Baseband OR, which should form the basis
for the preparat ion of the MEN S, will now have to be written
in terms of a mission need or capability rather than a pre-
determined hardware solution.
After approval of the MENS by SECDEF at Milestone
and entry into the Conceptual Phase, resources for explora-
tion of alternative systems will now have to be programmed
in advance. The Navy will have to ensure that R&D program
funds are identified with specified mission areas. The
requirement for the formal assignment and chartering of a
Program Manager after Milestone is a new although com-
patible change with the Navy procedure for generating a
Development Proposal (DP) in response to an OR. Now, hope-
fully, the Program Manager will be provided adequate support
earlier as an initial program action to develop the program
acquisition strategy and to help manage the solicitation
and evaluation segments of the Conceptual Phase.
After acceptable proposals to the mission need have
resulted from the exploration of alternative system concepts,
thejProgram Manager vass is ts in the preparation of the DCP
for SECDEF approval at Milestone I. After approving the
selection of one or more concepts to enter the Validation
and Demonstration Phase, SECDEF may now direct the Navy to





A change for the Navy during the Validation and De-
monstration Phase is the requirement for a set of constraints
as opposed to thresholds, within which the program is to be
operated within that phase. Performance, cost and schedule
estimates shall not be formalized at this time because the
systems are not yet defined adequately.
A change for the Navy is that, in addition to approv-
ing one or more proposals to proceed into the Full Scale
Engineering Development Phase, approval can now authorize
the program plan up to full production. Now, the Milestone
II approval includes long lead funding and limited produc-
tion as well as the set of thresholds for performance, cost,
and schedule parameters. The result of this change should
be the elimination of the previous sub-Milestone decision
points (DSARC IIA, IIB) by DSARC and OSD.
The Full-Scale Development Phase activities should
remain essentially the same as previous operations.
At Milestone III, a single decision for full produc-
tion and deployment to the operating forces is now possible.
The effect of this change is to help eliminate the previous
sub-milestone decision points (DSARC III, IIIA) by DSARC and
OSD. Additionally, with the SECDEF Milestone III decision
and approval of the DCP , the formal review process for a
Navy program at DOD level is ended. The Navy will report
quarterly to the SECDEF on program status and, as the program




The Production and Deployment Phase activities
should remain essentially the same as previously.
3 . Decentralization
In the third area of principal change, the decentra-
lization in program management and review functions, the
formal establishment of the Service System Acquisition Re-
view Councils by the new DOD Directives in the DOD acquisi-
tion process is compatible with the existing Navy System
Acquisition Review Council (DNSARC) . The formalizing of
the DNSARC as an acknowledged review council combined with
the SECDEF option of the permanent waiver of DSARC reviews
at Milestone I for programs not in specified categories
(such as joint strategic programs) and the SECDEF option
for the waiver of DSARC review for any program at any Mile-
stone point offers a significant improvement for Navy
decentralization. The waiver of the DSARC and increased
use of the DNSARC by SECDEF could result in reduced program
review and increased program control for the Navy Program
Manager
.
C. INCORPORATION OF CHANGES
The incorporation of the proposed changes of the new
DOD Directives and the anticipated changes in Navy Instruc-
tions for the Navy's Major System Acquisition process are
now summarized.
The technology base called for by Circular A-109 and
required by the Navy for its future systems is set forth
in the Science and Technolgoy Objective (STO) [Ref. 62]
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document, which describes in broad terms the Navy role and
objectives anticipated in a particular warfare area in the
10-20 year future time frame. An Advanced Systems Concept
(ASC) [Ref. 63] to propose future concepts emphasizing Navy
mission needs is submitted by NMC to OPNAV. The STO and
ASC form the basis for the inputs of the Technology Base.
This Technology Base is then assessed in conjunction with
the OPNAV perceived threat to formulate concise statements
of operational (mission) needs. These statements of mission
needs form the basis for the preparation of a draft MENS by
OPNAV.
This draft MENS is then evaluated by the CNO Executive
Board (CEB) [Ref. 64] or by one of the CEB's sub panels;
the Ship Acquisition and Improvement Panel (SAIP) [Refs. 62
and 64] for CNO designated ship acquisition programs or the
Acquisition Review Committee (ARC)
,
[Ref. 62] for other CNO
designated programs. For Major Systems, the CEB recommends
to the CNO, for approval, the OPNAV prepared Mission Element
Need Statement (MENS) . This MENS, in turn, is coordinated
through the NAE to the SECNAV for approval. The MENS is
then coordinated through the DAE to SECDEF for his Milestone
decision point. Upon SECDEF approval, the MENS is sent
back through SECNAV to CNO with permission to enter the Con-
ceptual Phase .
CNO then issues the OR to be used by NMC and the Program
Manager as guidance for the Conceptual Phase. The Program
Manager then conducts the solicitation and evaluation seg-
ments of the Conceptual Phase. Upon identification and
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selection of satisfactory alternative solutions to the
mission need, CNM in coordination with the Project Manager
prepares and submits to OPNAV a Development Proposal (DP)
[Ref. 62] to present the alternatives and tradeoffs and to
identify recommended proposals. Upon concurrence by CNO,
the Navy Decision Coordinating Paper (NDCP) [Ref. 62] and
for Major Systems, the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP)
[Ref. 6] , is prepared and reviewed by the CEB and/or the
SAIP or the ARC. The NDCP/DCP is then coordinated through
the NAE to the DNSARC for review. Upon approval by the
DNSARC and the SECNAV, the DCP (for Major Systems) is then
coordinated through the DAE for review by the DSARC
Upon review and approval by SECDEF, at Milestone I, the
DCP is sent back to CNO with approval for the program to
enter the Demonstration and Validation Phase. Also, at
Milestone I, the SECDEF may waive the DSARC program review
requirement for future Milestone decision points and allow
the DNSARC to report via the NAE and DAE to the SECDEF.
The remaining phases and Milestone decision points of
the Navy acquisition process remain essentially the same
as before the issuance of the new DOD Directives.
The documentation and review process discussed in this




D REVIEW PT% C1DUR























VI . PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION OF CIRCULAR A-109
In this section, the method used by one Navy program to
implement the requirements of OMB Circular A-109 is presented.
The Navy's Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS)
program is introduced as one of the first DOD programs to
implement Circular A-109. The evolution of the SIRCS program,
which in actuality preceded Circular A-109, is traced from
its beginning to the present date, highlighting program ini-
tiation and structure, acquisition strategy, and operations
in the solicitation and evaluation segments of the Conceptual
Phase along with Congressional influences. The continued
operation of the SIRCS Program under Circular A-109 is pro-
jected for the Validation and Full-Scale Development Phases.
Some inherent Circular A-109 problems incurred by the SIRCS
Program are investigated along with the critical requirements
of the competitive concept formulation. The status of the
SIRCS Program implementation is analyzed through a compari-
son of SIRCS Program acquisition strategy with the 12 applic-
able Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) recommenda-
tions presented in Section II.
A. SIRCS PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS)
program was established to develop a new, generation ship-
board system for the Navy to provide a balanced intermediate
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range offensive strike and self-defense capability. SIRCS
is to be a total combat system to provide Navy ships with
the capability of engaging antiship missiles, high perform-
ance aircraft, high speed surface craft, ships and shore-
based sites- It is to be an integrated, modular combat
system for the mid 1985-2000 time frame that would have the
system functions of detection, assessment/evaluation, command
and control, engagement, and neutralization and assessment.
SIRCS is to have a spectrum of platform capability from
small patrol combatants through fleet escorts, major combat-
ants, fast combat support and auxiliary ships to the large
strike carriers. A graphic presentation of the SIRCS system
capability is given in Figure 14.
The SIRCS Program is located in the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) of the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT)
.
Specifically, the SIRCS Project, designated PMS 404-40, is
under the direction of the Anti Ship Missile Defense (ASMD)
Project Office, PMS-404, of NAVSEA.
The period covering the SIRCS program initiation and
Conceptual Phase, from mid 1974 to the present, parallels
a period in which considerable policy changes occurred in
the area of development and acquisition of DOD Major Systems
as discussed in previous sections. The promulgation of the
formal documents implementing these policy changes (0MB Cir-
cular A-109 in April 1976 and DOD Directives 5000 . 1/5000 ..2
in January 1977) did not occur until after the initial SIRCS




























































Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) recommendations
and interaction with OMB/OFPP and OSD, was able to antici-
pate the emerging policy direction.
Key SIRCS program characteristics to be discussed in
this section include 1) Operational - a three-page user-
oriented Operational Requirement (OR) document that stressed
a modularized combat system approach and that represents an
effort to overcome deficiencies of past optimized sub-system
oriented developments; 2) Acquisition Strategy - use of com-
petitive industry concept studies, sustained industry com-
petition in future phases and integral government laboratory
involvement with the program office; and 3) Use of COGP
recommendations to influence the development strategy-compli-
ance with COGP recommendations resulted in compliance with
Circular A-109 principles.
B. SIRCS PROGRAM EVOLUTION
1 . Initiation
In October 1974, an OPNAV review of surface warfare
programs determined that there was duplicative development
in on-going efforts. This resulted in a decision to merge
the Advanced Anti-Ship Capable Missile (ASCM) Defense System
and the Lightweight Intermediate Caliber Gun System (LICGS)
developments into the SIRCS program. A number of lesser
developmental efforts were also combined into the SIRCS pro-
gram with the restructured effort to address the multi-
dimensional threat in a more logical, integrated fashion.
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2 . Pro j ect Office
In April 1975, the ASMD Project Office (PMS-404) of
NAVSEA was assigned responsibility for the development and
acquisition of SIRCS, and the SIRCS Project Office was estab-
lished. PMS-404 delegated a significant portion of his
authority for planning direction and control of the program
to the SIRCS Project Manager while retaining final approval
authority. The SIRCS Project Manager serves as an interface
between the participating field activities, system command
divisions and directorates, contractor organizations and
PMS-404
.
One of the first courses of action the SIRCS Project
Manager took was the establishment and organization of the
SIRCS Project Office as shown in Figure 15. The SIRCS Pro-
ject Office uses a matrix system of staffing with a small
cadre of dedicated personnel supported by functional elements
within the System Commands. One interesting facet of the
SIRCS Project Office is the function of the Technical Plan-
ning and Advisory Board (TPAB) . The TPAB supports and ad-
vises the SIRCS Project Manager in planning, tasking, and
maintaining of system development. The designated members
of the board are senior members of the government laboratory
community with the authority to make resource commitments,
and the authority and responsibility to assume accomplish-
ment of tasks assigned to their organizations. A detailed
breakdown of the government laboratories and centers support-
ing the SIRCS Project along with their principal and asso-















































































































A second interesting facet of the SIRCS Project Of-
fice is the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) . The
SSEB is an ad hoc group established to develop the criteria
and methodology for evaluating the contractor deliverables
resulting from the competitive concept formulation. The
SIRCS Project Manager serves as chairman of the SSEB and is
supported by a support and advisory staff. The Chairman is
also supported by committees established to perform and plan
the analysis for various evaluation factors (Technology,
Integration, Military Factors, Management, Test and Evalua-
tion, Support and Cost) . The committees are chaired by head-
quarters personnel and consist of representatives appointed
from the NAVMAT Systems Commands, other Navy and OSD Offices
and Agencies, Navy Laboratories and support contractors.
The SSEB function during the Evaluation Segment of the Con-
ceptual Phase will be commented on later in this Section.
3 . Operational Requirement
On May 21, 1975, the CNO issued the SIRCS Operational
Requirements (OR) document (OR-SH-44), a three-page state-
ment of mission need independent of a predetermined, hard-
ware solution. The OR specified the mission capability re-
quired for an offensive and defensive combat system that
could provide a total detection through engagement capability
System flexibility was proposed for a system to be modularly
adaptable to the variations in ship platform size and con-
straints. The OR identified the nature of the threat varia-
tions and specified preliminary cost, performance and
reliability objectives for the system.
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Not only did the OR not specify a hardware require-
ment, it also did not specify a particular technical or
conceptual approach. New developments were neither required
nor desired unless significant benefits would result. The
OR proposed integration with existing hardware with provi-
sions for growth variants where feasible. The statement of
requirement in the OR was tailored for the purpose of com-
municating to industry a very broad, but bounded, problem
to which industry could respond with independently conceived
concepts. This broad initial statement of mission need pro-
vided industry with the flexibility to perform its own
tradeoffs and analyses, resulting in unbiased proposals.
4 . Acquisition Strategy
Using the COGP recommendations for guidance and the
OR for refinement, the SIRCS Project evolved the program
acquisition strategy to be used throughout the program
development. Five of the more important key elements of
the acquisition strategy are as follows:
-The requirement definition was mission oriented, not
hardware oriented. This is a key element in program
initiation directly impacting on the response from
industry. In the past, many programs eventually proved
to be deficient because not enough attention was given
initially to requirements definition.
-A spectrum of system level alternatives to satisfy
the mission need was considered. Traditionally, pro-
grams have conducted studies to determine preferred
sub-system hardware solutions to impose on industry
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resulting in over-specified and costly systems.
•Early industry involvement in system development was
conducted. The SIRCS Project issued a draft Request
for Proposal (RFP) and Cost Analysis Guide to industry
and to invite feedback comments for improvements to
the RFP and conduct of the concept formulation. This
rather novel approach resulted in a very beneficial
improvements to the concept development process drawn
from industry expertise not normally available to the
program office. Additionally, the industry was in-
volved earlier in the system definition by allowing
the contractors to explore system possibilities through
tradeoffs. For example, instead of the SIRCS Project
specifying a specific detection probability, industry
would be allowed to make performance and cost tradeoffs
to determine the required capability in the total
system context.
•The SIRCS acquisition strategy was designed to sustain
industry competition as long as it is beneficial, hav-
ing established the industry competition early in the
conceptual phase. The SIRCS Project would continue to
make incremental investments in the most promising
alternatives through prototype shoot-off as the number
of options is reduced. Throughout the development pro-
cess, competition was to serve as the pacing factor in
industry's concept proposals. The decision to use
existing, modified, or new developments was to be
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balanced between tradeoffs (cost, schedule, performance)
and the competitive incentive toward economy in design
activities .
-The government laboratory and technical community in-
volvement is a keystone to the successful implementation
of Circular A-109 in the SIRCS Program. The technical
and managerial expertise of the government laboratories
is needed to supplement NAVSEA and the SIRCS Project in
the assessment of industry's proposals and in the test
and evaluation of the candidate alternative systems.
Additionally, the government laboratories would maintain
the technology base called for in Circular A-109 and
would interact with competing contractors in the dissemi'
nation of information.
As discussed in Section IV, this element of the acquisi-
tion strategy calls for an organizational role change for
the government laboratories from their traditional role as
a technology and hardware advocate. The SIRCS acquisition
strategy discussed in this Section is in agreement with the
principles of Circular A-109 and the new DOD Directives
5000.1 and 5000.2 even though developed by the SIRCS Project
prior to the issuance of these documents.
5 . Conceptual Phase Activities
After formulating the program acquisition strategy
and in response to OR-SH-44, the SIRCS Project submitted to
NAVSEA for approval an advanced procurement plan for a com-
petitive Conceptual Phase with industry submitting alterna-
tive design concept proposals. The Navy then presented the
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SIRCS Project to the Principal Director, Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) the Honorable Robert N. Parker, on August
14, 1975. As a result, DDR&E issued a memo on August 15,
1975, which permitted a briefing to industry and allowed the
Navy to release the draft RFP . This memo required the Navy
to present a program review to DDR&E and to prepare a draft
Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) before awarding contracts
to industry. The action in meeting these two DDR&E require-
ments was in effect the receipt of OSD approval to proceed
with the Conceptual Phase and was, in essence, the Milestone
decision point, as required by Circular A-109, for the
SIRCS Project. Figure 16 indicates the SIRCS Project activi-
ties schedule for the Conceptual Phase.
The SIRCS Project next released a request to industry
for letters of interest. On August 19, 1975, an industry
briefing was held for 550 contractor personnel representing
213 companies and agencies. Briefing topics included: an
overview of the SIRCS Program, the SIRCS OR (OR-SH-44) and
the program acquisition strategy (as previously discussed in
this Section) ; a program plan to use four competing contrac-
tors in the Conceptual Phase, two competing contractors in
the Validation and Demonstration Phase, and one contractor
in the Full Scale Development Phase; industry participation
stressing the fact that, once selected, a contractor would
be developing his own system from concept formulation to
production; government 1 abora tor i es -co n tractor interfaces


























































































































libraries; and a solicitation for industry feedback on draft
copies of the RFP
.
As a result of this solicitation for industry feed-
back, several beneficial comments regarding general applica-
tion, proposal preparation instructions, and Concept Devel-
opment Report (CDR) requirements were received and incor-
porated by the SIRCS Project Office.
On October 31, 1975, the SIRCS Source Selection Plan
was approved allowing industry to compete to define SIRCS.
On the same day, the RFP was released to 21 companies the
Navy considered qualified. Key points contained in the RFP
included
:
-Proposal Preparation Instructions which called for an
understanding of the problem and study requirement and
for an approach to doing a study to solve the problem
and to response to the study requirement.
-Evaluation and Award Criteria for both the Conceptual
Phase and the Demonstration and Validation Phase which
would be used to evaluate both the proposed approach
to the study and the resulting concepts. This unique
feature conveyed to industry the relative importance
that the Navy placed on performance, cost and risk
elements in concept proposals.
-Procurement Strategy which called for up to four cost-
type contracts to be awarded in the Conceptual Phase
and two cost-type contracts to be awarded in the
Demonstration and Validation Phase.
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-Documents and Attachments containing the Concept Devel-
opment Report (CDR) formal and abstracts of ten items
of Government- furnished information (GFI) which was to
be furnished at a later date. Part of the CDR called
for a Demonstration and Validation Phase Proposal to
be delivered at the conclusion of the Conceptual Phase.
The Navy planned to require a proposal for the next
phase at the end of each subsequent phase. The Navy-
could, therefore, continue further development of
selected concepts without procurement delays through a
series of carefully planned incremental investments.
-Description and Specifications which contained one of
the unique features of this RFP - a one paragraph State-
ment of Work which simply read as follows [Ref . 58]
:
"...undertake an indepth study... to develop a system
concept to meet the Operational Requirement for SIRCS
and ... develop a formal proposal to validate this
system concept."
In response to the SIRCS RFP, seven contractors sub-
mitted proposals for evaluation. The offerors included
General Dynamics, General Electric, Grumman, Hughes, McDonnell'
Douglas, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) , and Raytheon.
On January 5, 1976, the SIRCS Project Office, assisted by
previously discussed support personnel, began a four-month
evaluation of the seven proposals for understanding of the
problem and the approach to conduct the study to solve the
problem. The award criteria favored those contractors who
could produce a substantial portion of the system.
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During the later portion of the proposal evaluation,
the SIRCS draft DCP was distributed and reviewed by high-
level Navy and OSD personnel. In April 1976, a revised
draft DCP (DCP #163) was presented to OSC for comment before
contracts were awarded, as previously required by DDR&E.
The draft DCP contained the following [Ref. 27]:
-A description of the problem which led to SIRCS includ-
ing the anti-ship missile, surface ship and shore
threats; the anti-air warfare and anti-ship missile
defense system limitations; and the surface strike
warfare system deficiencies.
-An operational requirements section which stated the
needs and goals independently of any system hardware.
-Recognition of the Navy as the agency component respon-
sible for developing SIRCS.
As previously indicated, this submittal to OSD of the draft
DCP combined with the previous DDR&E to proceed with the
solicitation to industry constituted the SIRCS Milestone
decision point called for by Circular A -109.
In May 1976, as a result of the proposal evaluation,
three separate, funded cost-type concept formulation study
contracts were awarded to McDonnell-Douglas, Raytheon, and
RCA. The nine-month contracts committed each contractor to
develop an independent concept for a totally integrated sys-
tem based upon its analysis of the requirements, existing
development efforts and available or emerging technology.
The SIRCS acquisition strategy had originally called for
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the award of four concept formulation study contracts. Be-
cause of funding uncertainty (to be discussed later in this
section) created by the House Armed Services Committee ac-
tion on the FY-77 budget, the Navy deemed it prudent to
award only three competitige contracts to stay within the
anticipated funding constraints. The three selected con-
tractor teaming arrangements and subcontractors are given
in Appendix L.
It should be noted that attention was given by each
of the three competing contractors to the use of North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country subcontractors.
In the course of the competitive industry studies,
oral progress reviews by the contractors to the SIRCS Pro-
ject Office were planned. Oral reviews were used instead
of long, formal, written reviews to alleviate the adminis-
trative burden of the contractors. The reviews were planned
to aid the contractors in individually evaluating their own
progress and to provide insight into the study concept.
This insight helped to prepare questions and to anticipate
evaluation team expertise required for the different tech-
nologies to be analyzed in the concept evaluation segment.
To assist in bounding the requirements definition
problem called for in the broadly defined operational need,
each competing contractor was given three specific types of
additional information. First, an Operational Requirement
Expansion was provided which presented a spectrum of quanti-
tative performance goals and thresholds providing a region
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within which the contractor could perform tradeoffs. This
OR Expansion has proved to be a cornerstone of Circular
A-109 implementation. Second, the Navy provided baseline
information so that each contractor could respond to the
same set of defined constraints. This baseline information
included threat and target parameters, environmental fac-
tors, expected platforms, 1990 fleet composition and weapon
systems, composite scenarios and Navy test and evaluation
resources. Third, a Cost Analysis Guide provided cost esti-
mating guidance and assumptions, emphasizing Design-To-Cost
(DTC) and Life-Cycle-Cost (LCC) concepts. This cost estima-
tion guidance is critical for Circular A-109 implementation.
Additionally, this information was supplemented by oral
briefings on technology base programs and by the establish-
ment of a GFI library containing over 2000 technical docu-
ments, study reports, and system manuals. A description of
the Government-furnished information is given in Appendix M.
Contractor flexibility in specifying a preferred
system concept was one of the main thrusts in the SIRCS com-
petitive industry studies. The GFI documentation called for
a commitment to a preferred system concept but emphasized
that a detailed hardware solution was premature at that time
due to the complex nature of the SIRCS problem. While dis-
couraging a premature detailed hardware solution, the Navy
did require from each contractor a proposal that could be
evaluated. The CDR called for a flexibility in a design
within a feasible region containing an optimal central point
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about which design iterations could be performed within
that region. A graphic example of this design region flexi-
bility is given in Figure 17. (The OR Expansion provided
additional performance goals and thresholds.) Flexibility
was called for in the CDR by requiring:
-Modularity in design to make SIRCS compatible with
the five specific paltforms as well as 26 classes of
ships
.
-Fall-back alternatives for risk reduction.
-Capability growth assessment to keep SIRCS responsive
to the threat in the 1990 time-frame in the event of
a threat change.
-System alternatives under funding variation (+ 1/3
available RDT&E and production funds)
.
This flexibility in the contractor's CDR required a more
complex evaluation but resulted in a more realistic concept
proposal
.
Another of the main thrusts of the SIRCS program
has been the introduction of cost consciousness into concept
formulation in accordance with Circular A-109 principles.
The OR specified a cost goal of $10 million or 10% of plat-
form replacement cost, no absolute performance capability
and the use of DTC principles in the development. This cost
goal structure provided a crude but convenient sliding scale,
establishing upper cost limits for various configurations of
SIRCS to meet differing ship mission requirements. The Cost
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extensive LCC elements. The CDR called for cost analysis
and methodology plus DTC considerations and planning. The
Evaluation Criteria (to be discussed later in this Section)
gives equal weight to system military worth and system
cost. Thus, the SIRCS Project Office established a rigorous
cost discipline at the beginning of concept formulation to
help control the tendencies of past programs toward high
cost system alternatives.
The SIRCS Project Office also stressed a balancing
of cost and performance through system design interaction
throughout the program life. Figure 13 illustrates the cost
and performance refinements resulting from the changing de-
gree of system definition and risk reduction as the program
progresses. The SIRCS Project Office recognizes the need
for system design iteration and the correct degree of flexi-
bility for design tradeoffs during each successive phase.
The degree of cost and performance definition must be com-
patible and tailored for the particular development phase.
In the past, detailed design specifications have been estab-
lished too early resulting in significant engineering-change
proposal (ECP) effort in the Full-Scale Development and
Production Phases.
During the nine-month competitive industry studies
segment, three oral progress reviews were held in August
and October 1976 and January 1977. As a result of these re-
views, it became apparent to the SIRCS Project Office that
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the problem and were successfully formulating their recom-
mended solutions to the OR. When questions did arise, the
SIRCS Project Office was responsive to each inquiry, care-
fully ensuring that each contractor received the same infor-
mation. As Mr. Robert Weiser, McDonnell-Douglas, SIRCS
Program Manager, stated in an interview, "The communication
with the Navy Project Office was excellent. They were very
willing to discuss and explain the Navy problem while not
indicating a preferred solution... I think the Navy Project
Office (SIRCS) is doing an excellent job of implementing A-
10 9" [Ref . 65] .
On March 4, 1977, the Concept Development Reports
(CDR) from each of the three competing contractors were
delivered to the SIRCS Project Office. On March S, 1977,
the Source Selection Evaluation Board was convened to begin
the concept evaluation segment of the Conceptual Phase.
Initial analysis (Phase I) of the SSEB indicated that all
three contractors could meet the requirements of the mission
need (OR). The SIRCS Project Manager was "very satisfied
with the proposals and pleased that each proposal offered
a different technical solution. This was exactly what A-109
specified and set out to do. I am confident I have three
separate system alternatives to meet the mission need...
This points up the value of A-109 and the use of competition
in concept formulation" [Ref. 28],
The Evaluation Criteria structure (previously stated
in the RFP) used in the CDR analysis is illustrated in
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importance moving left to right, with shading indicating
relative importance. The equal weighting of Military Worth
and System Cost reflects one of the more important points
in the SIRCS acquisition strategy-- the resolve to achieve
an affordable design for SIRCS. One of the prime objectives
of the criteria is to keep the evaluation focused at the
system level. A detailed explanation of the Evaluation Cri-
teria is given in Appendix N.
In November 1977, following a two-month delay caused
by FY-78 budget perturbations, the Source Selection Evalua-
tion Board (SSEB) completed the evaluation of the separate
CDR's from the three competing contractors. McDonnell-Douglas
and Raytheon have been tentatively selected for recommenda-
tion to proceed into the Validation and Demonstration Phase.
Upon completion of review of the SSEB final report by the
Source Selection Advisory Board, chaired by RADM C. P. Ekas,
MAT-08, and the Source Selection Authority (SSA), ADM. F. H.
Michaelis, CNM, the DCP will be updated and DSARC I will
occur (now forecast for March 1970) . It is also anticipated
the OSC Milestone I decision point will occur in March 1978.
A complete chronology of SIRCS events to date is
given in Appendix B.
C. SIRCS PROGRAM PLANNING FOR FUTURE PHASES
1
.
Demonstration and Validation Phase
The SIRCS Project Office has as one of its main ob-
jectives in the Demonstration and Validation Phase to resolve
high system risks to a level acceptable to the Navy and
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sufficient to proceed to Milestone II. Additionally, cost,
performance, and schedule trade-offs will continue to be
made by the two remaining contractors with reliability and
maintainability having an increasingly important role. The
trade-off process will be bounded by specified cost-perform-
ance goals and thresholds. This will be comprised of veri-
fication of the total system: surveillance, detection and
identification, conduct and engagement, including both soft-
ware and hardware. The system demonstration will be compe-
titive and will be conducted at a Navy Land-Based Test Site,
as will all subsystem level tests providing data to the
system demonstration. The Full Scale Development (FSD) Phase
Award Criteria to guide the validation effort will be
speci f ied
.
The Demonstration and Validation Phase Proposal will
contain a contractual document between the Navy and the con-
tractor that will clearly and explicitly define the work to
be accomplished. The contractor will provide system and sub-
system performance specifications in response to Navy guide-
lines. The contractor will also provide LCC estimates and
a Full Scale Development Plan Proposal. This requirement
for the next phase proposal is a significant factor in Cir-
cular A-109 implementation. This requirement holds the prom-
ise of shortening the development cycle because it offers
the opportunity to minimize delay or lag between phases as
has occurred in the past.
The Demonstration and Validation Phase is anticipated
to require a three-year time period with Milestone II, the
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Full Scale Development Decision Point Scheduled for September
1981. A detailed description of the SIRCS Demonstration and
Validation Phase strategy is given in Appendix 0.
2 . Full Scale Development Phase
Even though present SIRCS program strategy calls for
only one contractor in the Full Scale Development (FSD)
Phase, parallel development will be continued if funding is
sufficient [Ref. 66]. If funds are constrained, necessitat-
ing a single prime contractor, the following measures to
offset any loss of competition at the prime level should be
emphas ized
:
-Pilot Production Option Clause





-Breakouts where feasible for competitive procurement
The purpose of these measures is to keep the cost
from escalating. The contractor will be required to specify
his DTC goals and to project his cost to deliver the system.
The Navy will have the right to exercise this option. How-
ever, since the SIRCS system will be closer to production
during this phase, there should be less risk involved and
system cost should be well developed. The estimated develop-
ment cost is about $500 million, and the total cost goal in
production is expected to be $3-$6 billion.
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The FSD Phase is anticipated to require a four-year
time period with Milestone III, Production Decision Point
scheduled for September 1985. A forecast schedule of SIRCS
Milestone is given in Figure 20.
D. LESSONS LEARNED
1 . Critical Requirements for a Competitive
Concept Formulation
As a result of the experience of being one of the
first programs to implement Circular A-109 principles, the
SIRCS Project Office has listed the following as critical
requirements for a competitive concept formulation [Ref. 66
-Formulate mission oriented requirements; care must be
taken in the preparation of the MENS to ensure that
mission needs rather than hardware solutions are pro-
posed, the MENS then should become an integral part
of the OR and DCP.
-Develop flexible and mission oriented evaluation cri-
teria; the criteria should serve as a means of convey-
ing to the contractor the needs and requirements of
the customer (Navy)
.
-Ensure that proposals and innovative concepts also
address real world functional constaints; evaluation
constraints and thresholds should serve as a guide to
the contractor.
-Provide a comprehensive Government- furnished informa-
tion (GFI) package; a necessary item to ensure avail-
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-Control Government-contractor communications; control
of industry's access to Government laboratories is
necessary to ensure fairness in competition.
-Plan for oral progress reviews: use competition or the
threat of competition as a pacing factor.
-Obtain industry review and feedback; an excellent
method to supplement managerial and technical expertise
of customer (Navy)
.
-Form solid Government team; project office, mission
sponsor, function codes, cost analysts, contracts, legal,
and laboratories; the TPAB and SSEB are necessary
elements of the project team.
2 . Budgetary Perturbations
One of the primary difficulties for the 5IRCS Project
Office has been the budgetary perturbations imposed by some
elements of Congress attempting to micromanage the program.
During the initiation stages of the program, the
SIRCS Project had little trouble obtaining its desired fund-
ing, receiving a cumulative total of $3.2 million for study
funds in FY-74 and FY-75, $4.5 million in FY-76 and $6.7
million in FY-7T (transition quarter) [Ref. 67], The House
Armed Services Committee (HASC) staff members reported that
they thought the money was going for development of a so-
called "lightweight fire control system", first evaluated
at the Navy's Dahlgren facility during the Vietnam War. In
1976, these staff members discovered that SIRCS was not the
incremental improvement fire control system they wanted but
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was in fact a much different program that was implementing
Circular A-109.
As a result, the SIRCS Program was given mixed sup-
port in the FY-77 budgetary process as indicated by the fol-
lowing sequence of key events:
-House Armed Services Committee (HASC) recommended zero
funding authorization for FY-77 from a request of $16.1
million .
-Senate Armed Services Committee recommended funding
SIRCS at $12.0 million.
-Joint Authorization Committee - upheld HASC position,
but authorized $2.0 million of the line item "Fire Con-
trol Engineering" to be reprogrammed to SIRCS if the
Navy so desired.
-House Appropriations Committee, as constrained by the
earlier HASC action, recommended without prejudice
zero funding for FY-77.
-Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) reinstated SIRCS
as an independent budget line, recommended an appro-
priation of the maximum amount authorized of $2.0
million, and encouraged the Navy to take reprogr amming
action to offset the remaining budget deficiency in
FY-77.
-Joint Appropriations Committee upheld the earlier favor-
able action by the (SAC) , which resulted in an appro-
priation bill of $2.0 million in FY-77.
Again, during the FY-78 budget cycle, the SIRCS pro-
gram received mixed signals from Congress regarding their
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commitment to Circular A-109 policy. In the Authorization
Phase, the House deleted all SIRCS funding but this was re-
versed in conference [Ref . 68] :
"But a string was a ttached . . . . the conferees agreed to
fund the full amount reques ted . . . but with the under-
standing that the Navy would follow an open-ended
baseline approach ... in effect putting the program out-
side the requirements of A-109."
The signal was reversed in the Appropriations Phase. The
House approved the SIRCS funding, but the Senate zeroed it
[Ref. 68]
.
..."because of the committees view that the program
will not proceed in compliance with the Circular.
The conf erees ... failed to agree. ..But the House con-
ferees, deferring to the Senate position, will put
before the House a motion that will provide the $4
million but only on the condition that it is'expended
in compliance wi th ... Circular A-109.' If these motions
pass without modification, the instructions to the
Navy... would then appear to be: under the authoriza-
tion, manage the program outside of A-109; under the
appropriation, be sure to adhere scrupulously to the
A-109 guidelines."
Final action on the FY-78 DOD budget appropriated $3.99
million for the SIRCS Project provided Circular A-109 prin-
ciples continued to be followed.
A sequence of actions taken by Congress on the FY-7:
budget is given in Appendix P.
Due to these funding limitations, program plans had
to be modified. First, as previously discussed, only three
(instead of the planned four) study contracts were awarded
for the Conceptual Phase. Second, DSARC I and Milestone I
along with the resulting award of the Demonstration and
Validation Phase contracts have been delayed until March
1978 (instead of the original December 1977). Third, the
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depth of evaluation of CDR's has been reduced because of
reduction in numbers of Project team members (a two team
evaluation was reduced to one team) . Fourth, as previously
discussed, the evaluation process was delayed two months in
its completion.
Industry has taken note of the mixed support of Con-
gress for the SIRCS Project and Circular A-109. Mr. Max
Lehrer, Vice President of RCA and former principal advisor
to SECDEF on Defense program fiscal matters, stated in a
National Contract Management Association Meeting [Ref . 67]
:
"You might think that SIRCS--the only program acknow-
ledged to be carrying out Congress ionally ordained
new procurement policy— should be sitting pretty.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. While the Govern-
ment Operations Committee was applauding SIRCS, the
Armed Services Committees severely cut the funding
requested in the DOD FY-77 budget.
"Since Congress will now be directly involved in
approving DOD's needs and goals from the outset, it
is essential that Congressional approvals include
sufficient funding for both support of the acquisition
of competitive conceptual systems and subsequent
risk elimination tasks using parallel short-term
contracts .
"Timely and sufficient funding must also be available
to support DOD when the government selects the alter-
native systems to compete during the validation phase
--which normally includes essential prototyping to
eliminate potential cost drivers and risk.
"V7ithout adequate and timely funding, A-109 will be
just another noble experiment."
But Congress is not the only source of budgetary per-
turbation for the SIRCS Program. An apparent lack of inter-
face between the acquisition process (DSARC/DCP) and the PPBS
process during front-end program decisions may result in a
serious impact on program development cost and deployment
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schedule. At the same time the DCP was being approved by
OSD, funds for SIRCS were being taken out of the Five Year
Defense Plan (FDYP). In April 1976, after HASC action, a
Navy decision reduced the SIRCS line item by $155 million
in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM-78). OPNAV ac-
tion on the FY-78 budget proposes further cuts of up to $60
million in the FY78-83 time period. For the FY-78 budget
alone, a request for $22 million in the Navy Comptroller
(NAVCOMPT) submittal was reduced to $5.5 million during the
OPNAV review. This reduction occurred even though NAVMAT
had singled out SIRCS as the number one budget deficiency
in Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) and had stated that the
requested funds were vital if the industry teams were to be
maintained and momentum lost during FY-77 was to be regained
Unless sufficient funds are programmed in FY-79-80,
it is inevitable that the industry and laboratory teams will
begin to break up. This will lead to loss of a significant
investment and a return to business as usual in the acquisi-
tion process. The loss of competition will not only break
faith with industry but could prove to be an embarrassing
inconsistency for the Navy in view of its prior support for
the SIRCS development approach and Circular A-109.
3 . Other Problem Areas
In addition to the problem areas discussed in this
Section and in Section III.D., the SIRCS Project has en-
countered the following implementation difficulties:
-Life cycle cost and development cost trade-off - The
Project Office asks Congress for an increase in
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development funds while promising a decrease in over-
all life cycle cost.
-Availability of Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) funds for competitive studies and
demonstration - There is a present bias in the pro-
curement system against committing funds to a program
until the hardware is defined. Congress does not want
to pay for the full cost of concept formulation as
specified by OFPP and Circular A-109. There is a need
for more exploratory development funds to perform
adequate concept studies. The contractors invested
a great deal of their own resources to do the SIRCS
nine-month study.
-Defining and developing the cost/performance goals and
thresholds - An important requirement of Circular A-109
is to specify the cost goals within which the system
must be developed. There is a dichotomy between want-
ing the optimal operational system and being able to
afford to acquire the system after it is developed.
-Imparting enough flexibility to avoid a specific hard-
ware solution while maintaining distinct evaluatable
concepts - Trade-off iterations required for innovative
techniques must be balanced by a requirement for a
preferred concept.
-Briefing higher level review organizations while pro-
tecting the integrity of contractor information -
the proprietary aspects of the contractor proposals
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during the front-end development must be guarded in
the review process within the Navy, OSD and Congress
for acquisition and budgetary approval.
E. STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate the SIRCS program implementation of Circular
A-109, the 12 applicable recommendations ("Acquisition of
Major Systems") of the Commission on Government Procurement
(COGP) which formed the foundation of Circular A-109 are com-
pared with the SIRCS program elements. The COGP recommenda-
tions (found in Appendix E) have been summarized for ease of
comparison. Applicable paragraphs of Circular A-109 (found
in Appendix G) are noted in parenthesis with the COGP recom-
mendations .
COGP RECOMMENDATION
( Circular A-109 Paragraph)
Proqram to have Agency
head statement of needs





(6a, 7a, 10a, 10b)
Annual Congressional bud-
get reviews of agencies
missions and the needs
and goals for programs.
(6c, 14, 15a, 15b)
SIRCS PROGRAM ELEMENT
Implemented. This will
have to be reapplied at
each Milestone in acquisi-
tion cycle. No major prob-
lem expected with this
recommendation
.
DOD has responsibility to
submit SIRCS budget in
mission area format. Re-
sponsibility for implemen-
tation of this recommenda-
tion also belongs to Con-
gress. Congress is cur-
rently reviewing acquisi-
tion programs in a line-
item, piecemeal fashion.
With implementation of the
Congressional Budget Act
of 1974 calling for mission
area budgeting, Congress
should have a better under-
standing of the needs and
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team of experts for
evaluation
.
(7c, 7d, 7e, 8F , 8g, 10c,
lib, lie, lie)
.
goals of programs and be




feedback from industry and
Government labs in formaliz-
ing GFI data; used seven
industries in concept pro-
posal segment; used three
contractors in concept study




process keystone to SIRCS
acquisition strategy; use of
TPAB and SSEB to assist
SIRCS Project Office in
evaluation
.
Finance the exploration of
alternative systems by






alternative systems by use
of annual fixed-level con-
tracts assignment of Agency
representatives to contrac-
tors, utilization of Govern- are planned by SIRCS Project
ment organizations to
monitor and evaluate contrac-
tor efforts .
(6b, 7b, llg)
Implemented by SIRCS. Con-
gressional budgetary pertur-
bations have caused diffi-
culties for Project. This
critical element must be re-
solved to prevent serious




annual, are monitored by
periodic oral reviews; use
of plant representatives
and eval uation to monitor
Limit premature system
commitment
(11L, Hi, llj, 12a, 12b,
13a, 13b)
Implemented. Contractor
competition is a keystone






Obtain agency head ap-
proval if resources are




















dation will be applied at






Use contracting as a
system acquisition tool
using selective applica-









Unify policy making and
monitoring responsibili-
ties within each agency
and agency component.
(6d, 6e, 7F, 8b, 8c, 8d,
8e)
Implemented and planned for
implementation. This recom-




Implemented. Part of this
recommendation deals with
insuring the Project Office
is staffed with top talent.
This is being done on a con-
tinuous basis. The unifica-
tion of acquisition responsi-
bilities at the Navy and OSD
level have been completed
with the designation of the
Defense Acquisition Executive
and the Navy Acquisition
Executives
.
12. Delegate authority for
all technical and program
decisions to the operating
agency components except
for the four key agency
head decisions.
(8a, 9a, 9b, 9c, 9d)
OSD has responsibility for
the implementation of this
recommendation. The new DOD
Directives has the provision
for delegating to SECNAV and




From the previous discussion, it is evident that
the SIRCS program is being conducted in agreement with the
COGP recommendations for Major System Acquisitions and with
the implementation of Circular A-109. A detailed compari-
son of the COGP recommendations and the SIRCS program is
given in Ref . 2 7.
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VII . CONCLUSIONS AMD RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
For 20 years prior to the issuance of Circular A-109,
major system acquisition policy had been evolving in an en-
vironment which saw cost overruns, "gold-plating" of speci-
fications, schedule slippages, and inadequate performance
achievement. The economic environment of increasing fiscal
constraints combined with an increasing awareness in Congress
of the costliness of many Government programs called for
acquisition reform. Various study groups and reports
addressed these persistent problems but little reform re-
sulted. Finally, the Commission on Government Procurement
was organized and chartered by Congress to take an integrated
view of the deficiencies in major system acquisition. The
COGP report containing 149 recommendations was issued after
a two and one-half year study and has become the cornerstone
for Federal Government Acquisition reform. Twelve recommen-
dations concerning major system acquisition addressed the
areas of establishing missions needs and goals for new sys-
tems, exploring alternative systems, choosing a preferred
system, implementing the system and reorganizing acquisition
management structure and authority and responsibility
re la t ions hips
.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy, formed as a
result of one of the COGP recommendations, issued 0MB
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Circular A-109 in April 1976 to establish Federal govern-
ment policies in the acquisition of major systems. The 12
major system acquisition recommendations of the COGP form
the foundation of the new circular. Circular A-109 defines
the system acquisition process starting from the agency's
reconciliation of its mission needs with its capabilities,
priorities and resources to the introduction of the system
into operational use. The language of Circular A-109 is
broad enough to permit a degree of flexibility to tailor
the principles to each program individually but specific
enough to ensure compliance. The main points of Circular
A-109 are the redefinition of levels of responsibility for
policy decisions and budget control, for identification and
approval of mission needs and goals and for the management
of the acquisition process. Additionally, Circular A-109
relates major system acquisition to agency mission needs
and goals, requires early development effort in design con-
cepts rather than hardware solutions, establishes early
Congressional review of these mission needs and goals, and
calls for early research and development effort to satisfy
any deficiencies in mission needs and goals. Finally,
Circular A-109 calls for early and meaningful competition
with improved opportunities for innovative private sector
contributions, and for avoidance of premature commitment to
full-scale development and production.
Recent developments in budget execution and expenditure
control, particularly Mission Area Budgeting, the Con-
gressional Budget and Impoundment Act, and Zero-Based
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Budgeting, will impact on the effectiveness of implementa-
tion of Circular A-109. Careful coordination and liaison
will be necessary to prevent conflicts.
There are some potential problem areas in the implemen-
tation of Circular A-109, particularly in defending and
justifying funding. These budget difficulties are a result
of the requirement to commit funds to a project before the
hardware is defined, the proprietary nature of competing
concepts and hardware limiting disclosure, the necessity to
quantify long-term benefits of competition, and the dilemma
of defining cost goals prior to hardware definition.
Within the Department of the Defense and the Department
of the Navy, new directives have been issued or are in the
process of being issued to implement Circular A-109. Three
areas of required major change to Navy acquisition policies
and procedures are redefinition of organizational positions
and roles, restructuring of the front-end of the Major Sys-
tem life cycle, and decentralization in acquisition decision-
making and program management.
The Shipboard Intermediate Combat Range System project
is one of the first programs to successfully implement
Circular A-109. The acquisition strategy that was formulated
at program initiation and followed through to date in the
latter stages of the Conceptual Phase is in agreement with
the COGP recommendations and Circular A-109 principles. The
planning for the Demonstration and Validation and the Full
Scale Development Phases indicate continued compliance. The
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SIRCS experience gained regarding the critical requirements
for concept formulation and the budgetary and other problem
areas should prove to be a valuable example for the future
implementation of Circular A-109 in other programs.
B. FINAL REFLECTIONS
Initial implementation of Circular A-109 has provided
an insight to several long-term benefits of major system
acquis i t ion
.
Through requirements definition in terms of mission
needs, an improved linkage of resource inputs to program
needs can be made. Development funds expended under Circu-
lar A-109 will be tied to mission area requirements instead
of some predetermined hardware solution. An important step
to formalize this benefit within DOD in resource allocation
has been the establishment of the Mission Element Need
Statement (MENS). As a basis for DOD program initiation
approval, this should serve as a key element for improved
linkage between resource inputs and service needs.
The early industry participation called for under
Circular A-109 improves the chance for innovation. The
industrial competition and promise of substantial future
business has fostered an atmosphere of inventiveness and
innovative approach to problems. The resulting system con-
cepts have displayed unique balances between cost, perform-
ance and risk parameters. Realistic and objective proposals
reflect this innovative atmosphere.
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Requirements definition in terms of mission needs re-
quires a system level solution and reduces the potential
for sub-system optimization due to an in-house bias. Trade-
off opportunities for sub-system development become more
available in system-level optimization. Cost-effective
systems are possible through a more proper balance of sub-
sys terns
.
As a result of early industry involvement called for
under Circular A-109 principles, a system engineering
approach to concept formulation is now available. Previous-
ly, this system engineering approach was rarely achievable
utilizing only in-house Government bureaucracy for concept
design during the initial stages of a program. The highly
differentiated and platform (hardware) oriented headquarters
and laboratory facilities severely hampered the rational
system engineering approach. Favored, preconceived hardware
solutions were often specified to industry with little con-
sideration for tradeoff analysis. The highly complex inte-
gration of future systems will require the disciplined
systems engineering approach.
Implementation of Circular A-109 holds the promise for
the reduction of development leadtime. Parallel development
should provide options to preclude schedule slippage. The
requirement fcr the next phase proposal forces advanced
planning and minimizes the previously-experienced internal
program delays due to generation of new solicitations and
their responses. Additionally, the strengthening of the
Program Manager's authority and responsibility and the
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decentralization of acquisition decision-making minimizes
the previously-experienced external program delays.
Strong industry competition provides for a potential
reduction in life cycle cost. The identification and reduc-
tion of risk in the cost/performance trade-offs forced by
competition should help preclude the large cost overruns
of past projects.
But final implementation of Circular A-109 also requires
organizational role changes on the part of Congress, OSD
,
the service components, government laboratories and industry.
The problem now is one of educating and convincing the
parties of the obvious improvements to the system acquisi-
tion process that Circular A-109 offers. The implementation
may prove to be long and difficult but the potential rewards
of this major reform are significant.
The SIRCS Program described in this thesis is one of the
first DOD programs to follow Circular A-109 principles.
Other programs are in the very early stages of implementing
Circular A-109. Much experimentation, evaluation and lessons
to be learned remain ahead as these programs mature and
Circular A-109 is more widely implemented. The latent advan-
tages and potential pitfalls hold the promise of a challenging
investigation. Continued analysis by acquisition researchers
and student theses is recommended to report the unfolding
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National Contract Mr. Fred Dietrich OFPP
Management Associa- Mr. George Coleman NASA
tion
Major System Acquisi- Mr. Robert Berry DDR&E
tion
Conference, San Jose, Mr. Frank Forthopper Lockheed
California
26 May 1977
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Management Associa- Mr, Fred Dietrich OFPP
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Commission on Government Procurement (COGP)
Established (PL 91-129)
COGP Report (Part C "Acquisition of Major
Systems "
)
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)
Established in OMB (PL 93-400)
LICGS and ASCM Defense System merged into
SIRCS by the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering
SIRCS project management assigned to Naval
Sea Systems Command, Anti-Ship Missile De-
fense Project Office
Management and procurement strategy presented
to the Director
Operational Requirement issued by the Chief
of Naval Operations
Advance Procurement Plan approved by
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research
and Development, briefed on SIRCS
Principal Deputy Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, provisionally endorsed
SIRCS project
Letter issued by Director which requires
SIRCS project review and draft decision co-
ordinating paper in January 1976
Briefing given to industry
Request for proposal released


























Budget hear ings--Hous e Committee on Armed
Services
Budget hear ings--Senat e Committee on
Armed Services
House Committee on Armed Services Report
recommends elimination of SIRCS
0MB Circular A-109 "Major Systems Acquisi-
tion" issued
Final SSEB proposal evaluation completed
Decision coordinating paper sent for
informal review by various assistant
secretaries of Defense
Three (3) Concept Formulation Study Contracts
were awarded, one each for RCA, Raytheon
and McDonnell-Douglas at a combined value of
approximately $4.5 million
DCP forwarded by ASN (R&D) to DDR&E
GFI Feedback conferences held for
successful offerors
Raytheon, RCA, and McDonnell-Douglas pre-
sented their first Oral Progress Review
OFPP Pamphlet No. 1 "A Discussion of the
Application of 0MB Circular A-109"
DOD Directive 5000.30 "Defense Acquisition
Executive" issued
Oral Progress Reviews - RCA, McDonnell-
Douglas, Raytheon
OSD/OMB briefed on SIRCS FY-78 budget
TPAB meeting, re: SSEB membership and areas
of responsibility
Project Office key personnel visit to
McDonnell-Douglas plant




8 Dec 76 Project Office key personnel visit to
Raytheon plant
11-13 Jan 77 Oral Progress Review Number 3 presented
by each system contractor. Proposed
system concepts were briefed
19 Jan 77 DOD Directive 5000.1 "Major Systems
Acquisitions", DOD Directive 5000.2 "Major
System Acquisition Process, updated"
28 Feb 77 Briefing to SSAC - Weights for
Evaluation Criteria
4 Mar 77 Concept Development Reports (CDR) delivered
8 Mar 77 Convened SSEB
1 Apr 77 Concluded Phase I of SSEB on schedule.
Concept Development Reports of all three
contractors determined to be in competitive
range
7 Apr 77 The House Armed Services Committee recom-ended
mended deletion of the entire SIRCS FY-78
budget. See Appendix P
3 May 77 Senate Armed Services Committee approved
FY-78 TACAIR authorized budget, SIRCS
not marked. See Appendix P
17 May 77 Increase FY-78 SIRCS funding to 13.9 M
(Senate Bill) See Appendix P
20 Jun 77 Joint Authorization Conference Report--
SIRCS funded $3.9 M with direction to
define Navy Baseline and recompete for
Validation Phase. See Appendix P
23 Jun 77 SECNAV sends letter of support of
A-109 and SIRCS to Senator Chiles
29 Jun 77 Senate Appropriations Committee - SIRCS
- $0.0 M See Appendix P
4 Aug 77 Joint Appropriations Conference appropriated
$3,894 M for SIRCS with language for the pro-
gram to proceed in accordance with 0MB Circular
A-109. This language is in conflict with the






FY 79/80 NAVCOMPT hearings
SSEB tentatively selected McDonnell-
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LIST OF COGP RECOMMENDATIONS
ESTABLISHING NEEDS AND GOALS
1. Start new system acquisition program with agency head
statements of needs and goals that have been reconciled
with overall agency capabilities and resources.
(a) State program needs and goals independently of any
system product. Use long-term projections of
mission capabilities and deficiencies prepared and
coordinated by agency component(s) to set program
goals that specify:
(1) Total mission costs within which new systems
should be bought and used
(2) The level of mission capability to be achieved
above that of projected inventories and exist-
ing systems
(3) The time period in which the new capability
is to be achieved
(b) Assign responsibility for responding to statements
of needs and goals to agency components in such a
way that either:
(1) A single agency component is responsible for
developing system alternatives when the mission
need is clearly the responsibility of one
component; or
(2) Competition between agency components is
formally recognized with each offering alter-
native system solutions when the mission
responsibilities overlap.
2. Begin Congressional budget proceedings with an annual
review by the appropriate committees of agency missions,
capabilities, deficiencies, and the needs and goals for






3. Support the general fields of knowledge that are related
to an agency's assigned responsibilities by funding pri-
vate sector sources and Government in-house technical
centers to do
:
(a) Basic and applied research
(b) Proof of concept work
(c) Exploratory subsystem development. Restrict subsys-
tem development to less than fully designed hardware
until identified as part of a system candidate to
meet a specific operational need.
4. Create alternative system candidates by:
(a) Soliciting industry proposals for new systems with
a statement of the need (mission deficiency); time,
cost, and capability goals; and operating constraints
of the responsible agency and component(s) , with
each contractor free to propose system technical
approach, subsystems, and main design features.
(b) Soliciting system proposals from smaller firms that
do not own production facilities if they have:
(1) Personnel experienced in major development and
production activities
(2) Contingent plans for later use of required
equipment and facilities.
(c) Sponsoring, for agency funding, the most promising
system candidates selected by agency component heads
from a review of those proposed, using a team of
experts from inside and outside the agency component
development organization.
5. Finance the exploration of alternative systems by:
(a) Proposing agency development budgets according to
mission need to support the exploration of alterna-
tive system candidates.
(b) Authorizing and appropriating funds by agency mission
area in accordance with review of agency mission
needs and goals for new acquisition programs.
(c) Allocating agency development funds to components by
mission needs to support the most promising system
candidates. Monitor components' exploration of
alternatives at the agency head level through annual




6. Maintain competition between contractors exploring
alternative systems by:
(a) Limiting commitments to each contractor to annual
fixed-level awards, subject to annual review of
their technical progress by the sponsoring agency
component
.
(b) Assigning agency representatives with relevant
operational experience to advise competing con-
tractors as necessary in developing performance
and other requirements for each candidate system
as tests and tradeoffs are made.
(c) Concentrating activities of agency development
organizations, Government laboratories, and
technical management staffs during the private
sector competition on monitoring and evaluating
contractor development efforts, and participating
in those tests critical to determining whether
the system candidate should be continued.
CHOOSING A PREFERRED SYSTEM
7. Limit premature system commitments and retain the
benefit of system-level competition with an agency
head decision to conduct competitive demonstration of
candidate systems by:
(a) Choosing contractors for system demonstration depend-
ing on their relative technical progress, remaining
uncertainties, and economic constraints. The over-
riding objective should be to have competition at
least through the initial critical development
stages and to permit use of firm commitments for
final development and initial production.
(b) Providing selected contractors with the operational
test conditions, mission performance criteria, and
lifetime ownership cost that will be used in the
final system evaluation and selection.
(c) Proceeding with final development and initial pro-
duction and with commitments to a firm date for
operational use after the agency needs and goals
are reaffirmed and competitive demonstration results
prove that the chosen technical approach is sound
and definition of a system procurement program is
practical
(d) Strengthening each agency's cost estimating capa-
bility for :
(1) Developing lifetime ownership costs for use
in choosing preferred major systems
(2) Developing total cost projections for the




(3) Preparing budget requests for final develop-
ment and procurement.
Obtain agency head approval if an agency component deter-
mines that it should concentrate development resources on
a single system without funding exploration of competi-
tive system candidates. Related actions should:
(a) Establish a strong centralized program office within
an agency component to take direct technical and
management control of the program.
(b) Integrate selected technical and management contri-
butions from in-house groups and contractors.
(c) Select contractors with proven management, financial,
and technical capabilities as related to the prob-
lems at hand. Use cost-reimbursement contracts for
high technical risk portions of the program.
(d) Estimate program cost within a probable range until
the system reaches the final development phase.
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
Withhold agency head approval and congressional commit-
ments for full production and use of new systems until
the need has been reconfirmed and the system performance
has been tested and evaluated in an environment that
closely approximates the expected operational conditions.
(a) Establish in each agency component an operational
test and evaluation activity separate from the
developer and user organizations.
(b) Continue efforts to strengthen test and evaluation
capabilities in the military services with emphasis
on
:
(1) Tacticahly oriented test designers
(2) Test personnel with operational and scientific
background
(3) Tactical and environmental realism
(4) Setting critical test objectives, evaluation,
and reporting.
(c) Establish an agencywide definition of the scope of
operational test and evaluation to include:
(1) Assessment of critical performance character-
istics of an emerging system to determine use-
fulness to ultimate users
(2) Joint testing of systems whose missions cross
service lines
(3) Two-sided adversary- type testing when needed
to provide operational realism
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(4) Operational test and evaluation during the
system life cycle as changes occur in need
assessment, mission goals, and as a result
of technical modifications to the system.
10. Use contracting as an important tool of system acquisi-
tion, not as a substitute for management of acquisition
programs. In so doing:
(a) Set policy guidelines within which experienced
personnel may exercise judgment in selectively
applying detailed contracting regulations.
(b) Develop simplified contractual arrangements and
clauses for use in awarding final development and
production contracts for demonstrated systems
tested under competitive conditions.
(c) Allow contracting officials to use priced production
options if critical test milestones have reduced
risk to the point that the remaining development
work is relatively straightforward.
ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND PERSONNEL
11. Unify policymaking and monitoring responsibilities for
major system acquisitions within each agency and agency
component. Responsibilities and authority of unified
offices should be to:
(a) Set system acquisition policy.
(b) Monitor results of acquisition policy.
(c) Integrate technical and business management policy
for major systems.
(d) Act for the secretary in agency head decision
points for each system acquisition program.
(e) Establish a policy for assigning program managers
when acquisition programs are initiated.
(f) Insure that key personnel have long-term experience
in a variety of Government/industry system acquisi-
tion activities and institue a career program to
enlarge on that experience.
(g) Minimize management layering, staff reviews, co-
ordinating points, unnecessary procedures, report-
ing, and paperwork on both the agency and industry
side of major system acquisitions.
12. Delegate authority for all technical and program decisions
to the operating agency components except for the key
agency head decisions of:
(a) Defining and updating the mission need and the goals
that an acquisition effort is to achieve.
(b) Approving alternative systems to be committed to
system fabrication and demonstration.
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(c) Approving the preferred system chosen for final
development and limited production.
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20503
April 5, 1976 CIRCULAR NO. A- 10
9
TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
SUBJECT: Major Sy Litem Acquisitions
1. Purpose . This Circular establishes policies, to be
followed By executive branch agencies in the acquisition of
major systems.
2. Background . The acquisition of major systems by the
Federal Government constitutes one of the most crucial and
expensive activities performed to meet national needs. Its
Jjnpact is critical on technology, on the Nation's economic
and fiscal policies, and on the accomplishment of Government
agency missions m such fields as defense, space, energy and
transportation. For a number of years, there has been deep
concern over the effectiveness of the management of major
system acquisitions. The report of the Commission on
Government Procurement recommended basic changes to improve
the process of acquiring major systems. This Circular is




. Each agency head has the responsibility
to ensure that the provisions of this Circular are followed.
This Circular provides administrative direction to heads of
agencies and does not establish and shall not be construed
to create any substantive or procedural basis for any person
to challenge any agency action or inaction on the basis that
such action was not in accordance with this Circular.
4. Coverage
. This Circular covers and applies to:
a. Management of the acquisition of major systems,
including: ° Analysis of agency missions ° Determination of
mission needs Setting of program objectives
Determination of system requirements °
planning ° Budgeting ° Funding ° Research °
Development ° Testing and evaluation °








of the system into use or otherwise successful achievement
of program objectives
=
b. All programs for the acquisition of major systems
even though:
(1) The system is one-of-a-kind.
(2) The agency's involvement in the system is
limited to the development of demonstration hardware for
optional use by the private sector rather than for the
agency's own use.
5. Definitions . As used in this Circular:
a. Executive agency (hereinafter referred to as agency)
means an executive department, and an independent
establishment within the meaning of sections 101 and 104(1),
respectively, of Title 5, United States Code.
b. Agency component means a major organizational
subdivision of an agency. For example: The Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Defense Supply Agency are agency components of
the Department of Defense. The Federal Aviation
Administration, Urban Mass Transportation Administration,
and the Federal Highway Administration are agency components
of the Department of Transportation.
c. Agency missions means those responsibilities for
meeting national needs assigned to a specific agency.
d. Mission need means a required capability within an
agency's overall purpose, including cost and schedule
considerations
.
e. Program objectives means the capability, cost and
schedule goals being sought by the system acquisition
program in response to a mission need.
f. Program means' an organized set of activities
directed toward a common purpose, objective, or goal
undertaken or proposed by an agency in order to carry out
responsibilities assigned to it.
g. System design concept means an idea expressed in
terms of general performance, capabilities, and




operate or to be operated as an integrated whole in meeting
a mission need.
h. Major system means that combination of elements that
will function together to produce the capabilities required
to fulfill a mission need. The elements may include, for
example, hardware, equipment, software, construction, or
other improvements or real property. Major system
acquisition programs are those programs that (1) are
directed at and critical to fulfilling an agency mission,
(2) entail the allocation of relatively large resources, and
(3) warrant special management attention. Additional
criteria and relative dollar thresholds for the
do termination of agency programs to be considered major
#
systems under the purview of this Circular, may be
established at the discretion of the agency head.
l. System acquisition process means the sequence of
'oquisitXon activities starting from the agency's
reconci" .ation of its mission needs, with its capabilities,
priorities and resources, and extending through the
in\.roduction of a system into operational use or the
otherwise successful achievement of program objectives.
j. Life cycle cost means the sum total of the direct,
indirect, recurring, nonrecurring, and other related costs
incurred, or estimated to be incurred. in the design,
development, production, operation, maintenance and support
of a major system over its anticipated useful life span.
6. General policy . The policies of this Circular are
designed to assure the effectiveness and efficiency of the
process of acquiring major systems. They are based on the
general policy that Federal agencies, when acquiring major
systems, will:
a. Express needs and program objectives in mission
terms and not equipment terms to encourage innovation and
competition in creating, exploring, and developing
alternative system design concepts.
b. Place emphasis on the initial activities of the
system acquisition process to allow competitive exploration






c. Communicate with Congress early in the system
acquisition process by relating major system acquisition
programs to agency mission needs. This communication should
follow the requirements of Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular No. A-10 concerning information related to
budget estimates and related materials.
d. Establish clear lines of authority, responsibility,
and accountability for management of major system
acquisition programs. Utilize appropriate managerial levels
in decisionmaking, and obtain agency head approval at key
decision points in the evolution of each acquisition
program.
e. Designate a focal point responsible for integrating
and unifying the system acquisition management process and
monitoring policy implementation.
f. Rely on private industry in accordance with the
policy established by OMB Circular No. A-76.
7. Major system acquisition management objectives . Each
agency acquiring major systems should:
a. Ensure that each major system: Fulfills a mission
need. Operates effectively in its intended environment.
Demonstrates a level of performance and reliability that
justifies the allocation of the Nation's limited resources
for its acquisition and ownership.
b. Depend on, whenever economically beneficial,
competition between similar or differing system design
concepts throughout the entire acquisition process.
c. Ensure appropriate trade-off among investment costs,
ownership costs, schedules, and performance characteristics.
d. Provide strong checks and balances by ensuring
adequate system test and evaluation. Conduct such tests and
evaluation independent, where practicable, of developer and
user.
e. Accomplish system acquisition planning, built on
analysis of agency missions, which implies appropriate





f. Tailor an acquisition strategy for each program, as
soon as the agency decides to solicit alternative system
design concepts, that could lead to the acquisition of a new
major system and refine the strategy as the program proceeds
through the acquisition process. Encompass test and
evaluation criteria and business management considerations
in the strategy. The strategy could typically include:
Use of the contracting process as an important tool in the
acquisition program ° Scheduling of essential elements of
the acquisition process ° Demonstration, test, and
a, luation criteria ° Content of solicitations for proposals
Decisions on whom to solicit ° Methods for obtaining and
sustaining competition ° Guidelines for the evaluation and
acceptance or rejection of proposals ° Goals for design-to-
st ° Methods for projecting life cycle costs Use of data
ights ° Use of warranties ° Methods for analyzing and
evaluating contractor and Government risks Need for
developing contractor incentives ° Selection of the type of
>ntrrct best suited for each stage in the acquisition
-)cess ° Administration of contracts.
g. Maintain a capability to: ° Predict, review, assess,
negotiate and monitor costs for system development,
<^H.-ir -^ring, design, demonstration, test, production,
,r ct-i.n and support (i.e., life cycle costs) Assess
•- Usition cost, schedule and performance experience
\
-inst predictions, and provide such assessments for
/onsideration by the agency head at key decision points
Make new assessments where significant costs, schedule or
performance variances occur ° Estimate life cycle costs
during system design concept evaluation and selection, full
scale development, facility conversion, and production,
ensure appropriate trade-offs among investment ^costs,
ownership costs, schedules, and performance 'Use
independent cost estimates, where feasible, for comparison
purposes
.
8. Management structure .
a. The head of each agency that acquires major systems
will designate an acquisition executive to integrate and
unify the management process for the agency's major system
requisitions and to monitor implementation of the policies
and practices set forth in this Circular
-
b. Each agency that acquires—or is responsible for




establish clear lines of authority, responsibility, and
accountability for management of its major system
acquisition programs.
c. Each agency should preclude management layering and
placing nonessential reporting procedures and paperwork
requirements on program managers and contractors.
d. A program manager will be designated for each of the
agency's major system acquisition programs. This
designation should be made when a decision is made to
fulfill a mission need by pursuing alternative system design
concepts. It is essential that the program manager have an
understanding of user needs and constraints, familiarity
with development principles, and requisite management skills
and experience. Ideally, management skills and experience
would include: ° Research and development ° Operations °
Engineering ° Construction ° Testing ° Contracting
Prototyping and fabrication of complex systems ° Production
Business ° Budgeting ° Finance. With satisfactory
performance, the tenure of the program manager should be
long enough to provide continuity and personal
accountability
.
e. Upon designation, the program manager should be
given budget guidance and a written charter of his
authority, responsibility, and accountability for
accomplishing approved program objectives.
f. Agency technical management and Government
laboratories should be considered for participation in
agency mission analysis, evaluation of alternative system
design concepts, and support of all development, test, and
evaluation efforts.
g. Agencies are encouraged to work with each other to
foster technology transfer, prevent unwarranted duplication
of technological efforts, reduce system costs, promote
standardization, and help create and maintain a competitive
environment for an acquisition.
9. Key decisions
. Technical and program decisions normally
will be made at the level of the agency component or
operating activity. However, the following four key





a. Identification and definition of a specific mission
need to be fulfilled, the relative priority assigned within
the agency, and the general magnitude of resources that may
be invested.
b. Selection of competitive system design concepts to
be advanced to a test/demonstration phase or authorization
to proceed with the development of a noncompetitive (single
concept) system.
c. Commitment of a system to full-scale development and
limited production.
d. Commitment of a system to full production.
10. Determination of mission needs .
a. Determination of mission need should be based on an
analysis of an agency's mission reconciled with overall
capabilities, priorities and resources. When analysis of an
agency's mission shows that a need for a new major system
exists, such a need should not be defined in equipment
terms, but should be defined in terms of the mission,
purpose, capability, agency components involved, schedule
and cost objectives, and operating constraints. A mission
need may result from a deficiency in existing agency
capabilities or the decision to establish new capabilities
in response to a technologically feasible opportunity.
Mission needs are independent of any particular system or
technological solution.
b. Where an agency has more than one component
involved, the agency will assign the roles and
responsibilities of each component at the time of the first
key decision. The agency may permit two or more agency
components to sponsor competitive system design concepts in
order to foster innovation and competition.
c. Agencies should, as required to satisfy mission
responsibilities, contribute to the technology base,
effectively utilizing both the private sector and Government
laboratories and in-house technical centers, by conducting,
supporting, or sponsoring: ° Research ° System design
concept studies ° Proof of concept work ° Exploratory
subsystem development ° Tests and evaluations. Applied
technology efforts oriented to system developments should be




11. Alternative systems .
a. Alternative system design concepts will be explored
within the context of the agency's mission need and program
objectives—with emphasis on generating innovation and
conceptual competition from industry. Benefits to be
derived should be optimized by competitive exploration of
alternative system design concepts, and trade-offs of
capability, schedule, and cost. Care should be exercised
during the initial steps of the acquisition process not to
conform mission needs or program objectives to any known
systems or products that might foreclose consideration of
alternatives
.
b. Alternative system design concepts will be solicited
from a broad base of qualified firms. In order to achieve
the most preferred system solution, emphasis will be placed
on innovation and competition. To this end, participation
of smaller and newer businesses should be encouraged.
Concepts will be primarily solicited from private industry;
and when beneficial to the Government, foreign technology,
and equipment may be considered.
c. Federal laboratories, federally funded research and
development centers, educational institutions, and other
not-for-profit organizations may also be considered as
sources for competitive system design concepts. Ideas,
concepts, or technology, developed by Government
laboratories or at Government expense, may be made available
to private industry through the procurement process or
through other established procedures. Industry proposals
may be made on the basis of these ideas, concepts, and
technology or on the basis of feasible alternatives which
the proposer considers superior.
d. Research and development efforts should emphasize
early competitive exploration of alternatives, as relatively
inexpensive insurance against premature or preordained
choice of a system that may prove to be either more costly
or less effective.
e. Requests for alternative system design concept
proposals will explain the mission need, schedule, cost,
capability objectives, and operating constraints. Each
offeror will be free to propose his own technical approach,
nain design features, subsystems, and alternatives to




leas than full-scale development stages, contractors should
not be restricted by detailed Government specifications and
standards
.
f. Selections from competing system design concept
proposals will be based on a review by a team of experts,
preferably from inside and outside the responsible component
development organization. Such a review will consider: (1)
Proposed system functional and performance capabilities to
meet mission needs and program objectives, including
resources required and benefits to be derived by trade-offs,
where feasible, among technical performance, acquisition
costs, ownership costs, time to develop and procure; and (2)
The relevant accomplishment record of competitors.
g. During the uncertain period of identifying and
exploring alternative system design concepts, contracts
covering relatively short time periods at planned dollar
levels will be used. Timely technical reviews of
alternative system design concepts will be made to effect
the orderly elimination of those least attractive.
h. Contractors should be provided with operational test
conditions, mission performance criteria, and life cycle
cost factors that will be used by the agency in the
evaluation and selection of the system (s) for full-scale
development and production.
i. The participating contractors should be provided
with relevant operational and support experience through the
program manager, as necessary, in developing performance and
other requirements for each alternative system design
concept as tests and trade-offs are made.
j . Development of subsystems that are intended to be
included in a major system acquisition program will be
restricted to less than fully designed hardware (full-scale
development) until the subsystem is identified as a part of
a system candidate for full-scale development. Exceptions
may be authorized by the agency head if the subsystems are
long lead time items that fulfill a recognized generic need
or if they have a high potential for common use among






a. Advancement to a competitive test/demonstration
phase may be approved when the agency's mission need and
program objectives are reaffirmed and when alternative
system design concepts are selected.
b. Major system acquisition programs will be structured
and resources planned to demonstrate and evaluate competing
alternative system design concepts that have been selected.
Exceptions may be authorized by the agency head if
demonstration is not feasible.
c. Development of a single system design concept that
has not been competitively selected should be considered
only if justified by factors such as urgency of need, or by
the physical and financial impracticality of demonstrating
alternatives. Proceeding with the development of a
noncompetitive (single concept) system may be authorized by
the agency head. Strong agency program management and
technical direction should be used for systems that have
been neither competitively selected nor demonstrated.
13- Full - scale development and production .
a. Full-scale development, including limited
production, may be approved when the agency's mission need
and program objectives are reaffirmed and competitive
demonstration results verify that the chosen system design
concept (s) is sound.
b. Full production may be approved when the agency's
mission need and program objectives are reaffirmed and when
system performance has been satisfactorily tested,
independent of the agency development and user
organizations, and evaluated in an environment that assures
demonstration in expected operational conditions.
Exceptions to independent testing may be authorized by the
agency head under such circumstances as physical or
financial impracticability or extreme urgency.
c. Selection of a system (s) and contractor (s) for full-
scale development and production is to be made on the basis
of (1) system performance measured against current mission
need and program objectives, (2) an evaluation of estimated





contractor (s) demonstrated management/ financial, and
technical capabilities to meet program objectives.
d. The program manager will monitor system tests and
contractor progress in fulfilling system performance, cost,
and schedule commitments. Significant actual or forecast
variances will be brought to the attention of the
appropriate management authority for corrective action.
14. Budgeting and financing . Beginning with FY 1979 all
agencies will, as part of the budget process, present
budgets in terms of agency missions in consonance with
Section 201 (i) of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as
added by Section 601 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and in accordance with OMB Circular A-ll. In so
doing, the agencies are desired to separately identify
research and development funding for: (1) The general
technology base in support of the agency's overall missions,
(2) The specific development efforts in support of
alternative system design concepts to accomplish each
mission need, and (3) Full-scale developments. Each agency
should ensure that research and development is not
undesirably duplicated across its missions.
15. Information to Congress .
a. Procedures for this purpose will be developed in
conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget and the
various committees of Congress having oversight
responsibility for agency activities. Beginning with FY
19 7 9 budget each agency will inform Congress in the normal
budget process about agency missions, capabilities,
deficiencies, and needs and objectives related to
acquisition programs, in consonance with Section 601 (i) of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
b. Disclosure cf the basis for an agency decision to
proceed with a single system design concept without
competitive selection and demonstration will be made to the
congressional authorization and appropriation committees.
16. Implementation
. All agencies will work closely with the
Office Oi Management and Budget in resolving all
implementation problems.
17. Submissions to Office of Management and Budget .





a. Policy directives, regulations, and guidelines as
they are issued.
b. Within six months after the date of this Circular, a
time-phased action plan for meeting the requirements of this
Circular
.
c. Periodically, the agency approved exceptions
permitted under the provisions of this Circular.
This information will be used by the OMB, in identifying
major system acquisition trends and in monitoring
implementations of this policy.
18. Inquiries . All questions or inquiries should be
submitted to the OMB, Administrator for Federal Procurement
Policy. Telephone number, area code, 202-395-4677.

APPENDIX H
STATUS OF OMB CIRCULAR A-109 IN
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The following letter from Senator John L. McClellan,
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to
Honorable Robert Parker, acting director of DDRSE, regard-
ing the status of several DOD programs in compliance with
OMB Circular A-109, is an indication of the top level
interest of the legislative and executive branches. The
letter is followed by two enclosures, one with questions
regarding A-109 compliance and the other a list of DOD
programs in question. Following the enclosures is OFPP '
s




The Honorable Robert Parker
Dcpartaent of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301
Dear Mr. Parker:
with the requirements of "fficTof ^i3itl°n p0llclcs «• complyA-109. issued last year. fcTMnST"' and Buds" CircularWe been issued, and both fo^er 2SS^'c^' 50°°- 2 — 5000^Broun have indicated the policiesS Jf7, CleMae» •»<» Secretaryprograms beginning in 1977. "" ** implemented with new
budget requ^st^e wo" d^^to'l" »° 'u^ """« the " "78«e being conducted inc^,^J*" 1" «' «« »» Program-
Circular A-109. In
-cneral .if ° "iwlrenants of
budget tenuost. or those ', *" "*"» """toed in <he py 19?3
accordance with the new policies Att^'a T^ "' co""«"«4 to













ib" rT ^ ""^ llat . " ««>uld be
"Piles to the attached set of"u":^." '°U «»" P^vlde written
.aye.
"' "^ •«"<*' « havinr your rBapon,„ „itllla th ,rCy







QUESTIONS FOR EACH PROGRAI1 ON A-109 COMPLIANCE
General
:
(1) (a) Has the program office been instructed to
comply with the provisions of A-109 and
Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2? When, by
whom, in what form?
(b) Have program personnel been briefed on A-109
requirements and revisions to Directives
5000.1 and 5000.2?
Mission Need:
(2) (a) Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense
conducted the equivalent of a "Milestone-
Zero" decision to confirm the need for
increased mission capability? When, by
whom, in what form?
(b) Has a Mission Element Need Statement (MENS)
been prepared and approved? If not, when?
(3) Has the committee received a complete mission
justification for this program or activity?
(a) What generic kind of mission capability is
being sought?
(b) Under what scenarios would the mission capa-
bility be used and where?
(c) How do threat projections and defense
strategy combine to require increased
mission capability?
(d) What other program activities are underway







Competition and Source Selection :
(4) Has (will) the program presented industry with
a mission-based RFP , with free latitude to
propose system concepts, technological approaches
and design features?
(5) Is the program structured to maintain the inde-
pendent integrity of each proposed alternative
and not dictate common system design features
in a baseline system requirement?
(6) Is the program structured to permit sustained,
incremental development competition in order to
test, evaluate and eliminate less attractive
alternatives?
(7) Is the program structured to lead to the compe-
titive system demonstration of remaining con-
tractors in an operational mission environment?
If future resource constraints appear to preclude
competitive system demonstration, will competi-
tion be extended to the maximum extent and formal
notification be given to the committee as to why
source selection cannot rest on system demonstra-
tion?
(8) Are there any provisions of Circular A-109 that
the program will not comply with as it moves




63319A Conventional Airfield Attack Missile (CAAM)
63602A Advanced Land Mobility System Concepts
63624A Mobility
63301A Advanced Forward Area Air Defense System
63612A Advanced Mul ti-Purpose Missile System (AMPM)
63303A Surface-to-Surf ace Missile Rocket System
63725A Remotely Piloted Vehicles/Drones
NAVY PROGRAMS
63611M Landing Vehicle Assault
63310N Surface-to-Surf ace Missile Development
63311N Integral Rocket Ramjet
63365N Surface Anti-Submar ine Warfare Standoff Weapon
63564N Ship Development (Advanced)
63309N Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS)
63265N Remote Piloted Vehicles
63306N Advanced Air Launched Air- to-Sur face Msl System
63257N V/STOL Aircraft Development
63264N All-Weather Attack
63369N Air- to-Ground Standoff Weapons
63610N Advanced ASW Torpedo
63763N Aerospace Ocean Surveillance
64265N CH-53F




Proj . W0472-AS Advanced ASW Patrol Aircraft Weapon System
AIR FORCE PROGRAMS
63227F Advanced Simulator Development
63739F Advanced Drone/RPV Development
63242F Advanced Intercpetor Technolgoy
63439F Advanced Space Applications Program
64 312F M-X
63230F Combat Aircraft Technolgoy
63304F Within Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile




Nine programs are technology base efforts and may not



















Six of the 32 programs are not considred to be
programs by Defense:
ma j or 1
63319A Conventional Airfield Attack Missile
632 4N All-Weather A t tack- In terdi ct ion
63309N Air- to-Ground Standoff Weapon
63310N Surf ace- to-Sur face Missile Development
63365N Surface ASW Standoff Weapon
63624A Mobility
Four of the 32 programs, even though considered to be
"major" programs by Defense, will not comply with A-109
because they have already passed Milestones I and II:
64312F M-X
63301A Advanced Forward Area Air Defense System




Eight of the 32 programs will follow A-109 with no
excep tions
:
63612A Advanced Mul ti-Purpose Missile System
63611N Landing Vehicle Assault
63304F Within Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles
63230F Combat Aircraft Technology
64209F RF-X
63215N Land-Base Support Aircraft
63257N V/STOL Aircraft Development
63309N SIRCS
Five of the 32 programs are not going to be fully com-
pliant with A-109, even though no DSARC decisions have
been made and no RFP's have been issued to industry:
63316F Joint Beyond Visual Range Missle
63254N Air ASW
63763N Aerospace Ocean Surveillance
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THK •:";-.C: : ^VAr-V Of T!i£ NAVY
•.«.•/ '-MW siON D C 20350
l?i/
1 e H (i n :.- r r- bit I. aw t o n M . Chiles, J r
n'itc-cJ States Senate
..rhinrton, D. C\ 20510
ADVANCE COPY
eii: Senator Chiles
In accordance with your request, this letter confirms
. ?cc.., r ,. lCfeS j have given you on the telephone that the
avy l)er^v- r - n t supports and will continue to support using
he^vo^r-ires of OMB Circular A-109 generally, and supports
nine sc "est specifically in the S1HCS Program. There are
^'."Vo,,,! ,-e^ons why these? orocedurcs are appropriate for
^Vg D „ C;f- r . ;n Further, inasmuch as this program has, from
he be-inning, been advertised as an "A-109 Program" (to
,oth the Congress and to industry), I believe the program
jhovld continue to be so managed unless there are compelling
eascn^ to do otherwise. In particular, inasmuch as 0MB
'ircular A-10? embodies the acquisition process reform so
•troi'^ly di-ected bv the Congress, and inasmuch as industry
las been participating in good faith in this effort for
he Conrr^ss 10 direct termination of the process already begun
before an assessment of progress is even available will be seen
>y raany as breaking faith with both industry .and the Navy.
I am further distressed that the reason given in the
:onfe-ence- report for directing deviation from the A-109
>rocedures seems to be lased on a misunderstanding about
me Navy's flexibility M the SIRCS program. The enclosed
'>omt paper discusses tnis point in more detail.
I understand that you are now considering killing the
jrocram because of the directed deviation from A-109
jrocedures. I would hope that you could find, instead,
i way to correct the situation so that the Navy might
>roceed legally in the letter and spirit of A-109, perhaps
)y appropriate superseding language in the Appropriations
Jill. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss this
:urther with you, with the Chairman of the Appropriations
>r the Authorization Committees, or with anyone else you
relieve might assist you in rectifying the situation.
Sincerely
,






2] June 19 7 7
SKjTBOAj^D ir;TE?::£liI-.T£ RANGE COMBAT SYSTEM (SIRCS)
To interpret, in part, the accuracy of the language
cent a-ined in the 20 June 1977 Congressional Record
by the House Conferees concerning A-109 implications
to S1RCS.
TATS"^N? : "Under the program as presently structured the
Navy could not select the most desirable components
from individual contractors but would have to fund
continued development of the. complete systems of
two of the three contractors. 11 Congressional
record - House, 20 June 1977, page K6203. (TAB A)
ISCUSS.TON : ° Navy's plan to date has been to evaluate the total
SIRCS proposed by each contractor and to select for
validation the two contractor concepts that best
fulfil] the mission need;
° The Navy in STRCS is deliberately seeking to
optimize a system rather than individual components.
Competitive development of this total system seeks
' to maximize produceability and. af fordability
.
° Navy's compliance with the spirit of the Commission
on Government Procurement and Circular No. A-109 has
'been found consistent with the commission's intent.
(GAO Report of 2 4 Jan 77)
Contractual matters between the Navy and SIRCS
contractors are handled in the same fashion as with
any other government contracts.
3NCLUSIGNS: ° The statement in the Congressional Record as it
now stands is inaccurate. Although under the present
Navy SIRCS acquisition plan no selection of individual
contractor components is specifically planned , the
Navy can select the most desirable components from
individual contractors to formulate the optimum -
SIRCS, provided such components selected are not
proprietary. Such selected components would be
substituted within the winning contractor's total
system design.
° The above is operative for component selection
after a validation phase winner has been established.
Selection of components from among offerors prior











o Combat System Engineering




o Combat System Software
o Computers'
o Guns Systems
o Gun Fire Control
o EO Fire Control (SEAFIRE)
o Guided and Unguided Projectiles





o Command and Control
o Missile Fire Control
O NTDS, TDS










o Missile Fire Control
o Combat System Engineering






























































o Combat System Integration
o Software
o Missile Technology
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DESCRIPTION OF GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED INFORMATION
1. Operational Requirement Expans ion--de tails require-
ments, provides a basis for weapon performance
trade-offs, and discusses costing philosophy.
2. Threat and Target Base line— descr ibes representa-
tive threats and targets to be used in SIRCS design
and in predicting system performance.
3. Environment Baseline— identifies and defines certain
physical environmental factors, discusses electro-
magnetic compatibility requirements, and includes
a discussion of related military standards.
4. Platform Base line--descr ibes the flow of command
and physical and other characteristics of represent-
ative ships which are candidates to receive SIRCS.
5. Fleet Weapon System Base line— details all elements
of surface- and air-related ccmbat systems projected
for the fleet
.
6. Fleet Composition Baseline-- 1 i sts ships and combat
systems planned to be in service.
7. Cost Analysis Guide--provides common definitions,
assumptions, and formats for contractor cost analysis
The Cost Analysis Guide focuses on "design-to-cost"
and "life-cycle-cost" concepts and emphasizes the
importance of cost.
8. Scenario Baseline— is a set of detailed scenarios
for use in comprehensive evaluation of proposed
sy s terns
.
9. Navy T&E [test and evaluation] /Target/Range Resource
Baseline--describes test and evaluation resources
available for concept validation and full-scale
development of SIRCS.
10. GFI [Government-furnished information] Library-
includes additional relevant information and





The criteria for evaluation shall consist of, in decreas-
ing order of importance, a System Concept Factor, a Valida-
tion Phase Plan Factor, and a Validation Phase Cost Factor.
A. SYSTEM CONCEPT FACTOR
The SIRCS Concept proposed by the contractor will be
evaluated in terms of the degree to which, in the judgment
of the Government, it offers a technically and militarily
sound, affordable and cost-effective method of achieving the
goals set forth in the Operational Requirement (ORSH44) and
the other requirements of the Concept Formulation contract.
Three elements will be considered: System Military Worth,
System Cost, and Developmental Risk. System Military Worth
and System Cost are of equal importance and each is of
greater importance than Development Risk.
1 . System Military Worth
The purpose of this element is to evaluate the merit
of the contractor's proposed concept from a technical and
military ooint of view. The following will be considered.
Sub-elements a and b are of equal importance and each is of
greater importance than each of the other sub-elements, all
of which are of equal importance.
a. The degree to which the proposed system can be
expected to meet the requirements for separate engagements
in the air, surface, and shore warfare areas, and for simul-
taneous engagements in all warfare areas (as specified in the




b. The degree to which the proposed system can be
expected to meet the requirements, specified in the OR and
the OR Expansion, for each of the five baseline platforms.
c. The merit of the contractor's identification and
trade-offs of real world considerations, such as weapon sys-
tem performance, schedule, technology, environment, cost,
RMA , ship integration, system support and manpower, and risk,
used in developing his SIRCS Concept.
d. The degree to which the proposed system can be
expected to meet the availability requirements in the OR and
OR expansion; and the merit of the contractor's proposed
reliability program.
e. The merit of the proposed shipboard manning concept
f. The merit of the contractor's modularity concept.
g. The merit of the contractor's installation concept,
h. The merit of the contractor's platform considera-
tions concept.
i. The merit of the contractor's maintenance and
support concept (maintenance engineering, system support
planning, and system safety)
.
j. The growth potential of the proposed system.
k. The quality of the system specifications submitted
for each platform type.
2 . System Cos t
The purpose of this element is to evaluate the total
life cycle cost to the Navy of acquiring and operating the
system proposed by the contractor. The following sub-elements
are all of equal importance.
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a. The af fordabi li ty of the proposed system as re-
flected in its life cycle cost. In making this determina-
tion the realism, soundness, and credibility of the contrac-
tor's life cycle cost estimate will be taken into account.
b. The merit of the contractor's analysis, and the
results thereof, of the sensitivity of the proposed system
to variations in funding available for the program.
c. The merit of the contractor's recommended DTC
goals and the rationale therefor.
d. The merit of the contractor's trade-off studies
made in optimizing system LCC effectiveness.
e. The degree to which the contractor's proposed
management techniques, procedures, and schedule alternatives
and systems for implementation and control of the DTC effort
can be expected to minimize the chance of cost overrun and
maximize the probability of achievement of an affordable
system .
3 . Developmental Risk
The purpose of this element is to assess the degree
to which the contractor's proposed system is likely to achieve
its predicted performance within the predicted cost and
schedule goals. The following sub-elements, all of which are
of equal importance, will be considered.
a. The degree of rish associated with the proposed
system. In making this determination the realism, soundness,
and credibility of the contractor's assessment of risk will
be taken into account.
?na

b. The merit of the contractor's approach to mini-
mize risk and uncertainty associated with the recommended
system
.
c. The merit of the contractor's proposed Test,
Evaluation, and Demonstration program.
d. The merit of the proposed alternatives to be
implemented in the event of non-success of the higher-risk
items in the recommended system/subsystems.
B. VALIDATION PHASE PLAN FACTOR
The contractor's Validation Phase Plan will be evaluated
in terms of the degree to which it offers a technically
sound and practical method for demonstrating the validity
and viability of the proposed system concept during the
Validation Phase of SIRCS development. Two elements in
descending order of importance, will be considered: Techni-
cal and Management.
1 . Technical
The purpose of this element is to evaluate the con-
tractor's plan to evolve a system design and to demonstrate
that his design will perform as predicted. The end product
will be a set of specifications which will provide a basis
for proceeding into the engineering development phase with
confidence. The following s ub- e lement s , all of equal im-
portance, will be considered.
a. The degree to which the Validation Phase Plan
can be expected to result in the development of specifications
7 0S

for the system and major subsystems in accordance with MIL-
STD-490 and the degree to which that specification can be
expected to provide a sound basis for proceeding to Full
Scale Development.
b. The practicality and the efficacy of the exper-
iments that the contractor proposes be performed during the
Validation Phase and the degree to which these proposed
experiments can be expected to prove the validity of the
proposed concept.
c. The merit of the contractor's proposed schedule
for the Validation Phase.
2 . Management
The following items, of equal importance, will be
considered
.
a. The degree of control to be exercised by the
project manager over the Validation Phase effort, including
sub-contractors, and his relation to corporate top manage-
ment .
b. The degree to which company facilities will be
made available including the type and security thereof.
c. The degree to which project personnel are
identified, including their authority, responsibility, and
relation to the project manager.
d. The merit of the proposed work breakdown structure
e. The acceptability of the contractor's approach
to meeting the objectives of DOD Instruction 7000.2, "Per-
formance Measurement for Selected Acquisitions."
9 1 O

f. The merit of the proposed plan for implementa-
tion of Design-to-cost during the Validation Phase.
g. The merit of the proposed approach to interface
control and configuration management.
h. The merit of the contractor's proposed approach
to data management.
i. The merit of the contractor's identification,
discussion, and proposed solutions to management, schedule,
and cost problems which may occur during the Validation Phase
C. VALIDATION PHASE COST/FEE
The cost (including fee) to the Government of the
Validation Phase shall be the third factor. In evaluating
the offeror's proposal, his proposed estimated cost and the






SHIPBOARD INTERMEDIATE RANGE COMBAT SYSTEM
» VALIDATION PHASE TECHNICAL STRATEGY
INTRODUCTION
This paper defines the overall technical strategy to be employed
by the S1RCS Program Office during the Validation Phase of the system.
The strategy is expressed through a consideration of three points:
Validation Phase Objective, Management Responsibilities, and the Vali-
dation Phase Proposal.
OBJECTIVE
The technical objective of the SIRCS Validation Phase is to re-
duce system risk to a level acceptable to the Navy and sufficient to
proceed to Milestone II. To achieve adequate risk reduction, system
demonstration will be required. This is essential in view of the fact
that the system level requirements necessitate consideration of the
component integration and combat management as critical elements..
This objective is also in keeping with the current, and future, eval-
uation philosophy of measuring worth relative to the total system per-
formance.
The system demonstration will be comprised of verification of the
total system,: surveillance, detection and identification, management,
control and engagement, including both software and hardware. The
demonstration must be composed, at a minimum, of a system operational
effectiveness simulation based on actual tests of all new items, data
provided by the Navy on all components not under Contractor control,
and all major software algorithms.
The system demonstration will be conducted at a Navy Land-Base
Test Site, as will all subsystem level tests providing data to the
system demonstration. A single LBTS will be provided for use by both
SIRCS Contractors to use. This site will be the primary location for
all GFE.
MANAGEMENT
Responsibilities will be divided between the Navy and the SIRCS
Contractors as outlined below.
The Navy will be responsible for the following:
• Specify system cost/performance requirements;
• Approve all system level cost/performance changes pro-
posed by Contractor that exceeds agreed-upon limits;
• Define system demonstration model;
212

• Approve all test plans;
• Accept results of: all system demonstrations, subsys-
tem tests and critical item tests;








• LBTS location, design, construction, and operation;
• Monitor on-going DOD programs impacting SIRCS.
The Contractor will be responsible for:
System design;
System fabrication;
Propose and manage test plans and schedules;
Conduct of tests;
Analysis and report of tests;
Analysis of:
- System operational effectiveness,
- Integration and installation plans,
Reliability, maintainability, and availability
requirements
,











The Validation Phase Proposal will contain a
contractual document
between the Navy and the Contractor that
dearly and explicitly de-
fines the job to be accomplished. It will
clearly show the ove.a
objective of the Validation Phase. It will detai
respective respon-
sibilities of the New and the Contractor. It
will prov.de as ate
UTol worK that includes specifical ly de ine cuantt fia e
Structure' Toe pro^a! will define the evoiution
of the System Spec,
fications during the Validation Phase.
The statement of work will be developed
through an informal inter









SHIPBOARD INTERMEDIATE RANGE COMBAT SYSTEM (SIRCS)
Committee Recommendation
The committee recommends deletion of the Navy's entire request for
$3,894 million.
Basis for Committee Action
The Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System is intended to provide the
Navy with an intermediate range, combat system capable of engaging ships, air-
craft and incoming missiles.
The committee has, during the past several years, expressed serious
concern over the Navy's lack of weapon control capability that in many instances
severely constrains offensive strike capability. Industry and government labora-
tories have developed excellent sensors such as detection radars, tracking radars,
infrared tracking sensors, computers, stabilization systems, gun mounts and
missile launchers and numerous other subsystems that can be combined to replace
the current inventory of incapable weapon control systems within a brief period
of time and at a reasonably low cost. The SIRCS would not provide improved
weapon control capability for many years to come. Navy cost estimates to reach
an initial operational capability with SIRCS total over $650 million.
Navy representatives repeatedly have stated that other high priority
programs in the Navy preclude near term weapon control improvement efforts.
The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense would allow the poor
state of weapon control to continue into the next decade in order to fund a
system that is many years in the future. This philosophy could be understood
in the absence of solutions to the current problem; however, hardware exists,
solutions exist and the cost of these solutions is practical and affordable.
The projected cost of SIRCS is also difficult to comprehend. The AEGIS
system, a more complex, long range system, was developed for a fraction of the
proposed cost of the SIRCS.
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The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fighter aircraft currently operate
with three types of air-to-air missiles; the short range dogfight Sidewinder
heat-seeking missile; the medium range all-weather Sparrow radar-guided missile;
and the long range Phoenix interceptor missile (presently used only on the Navy
F-14) . The "Sea Sparrow" also is used as a surface-to-air missile on Navy
ships, and a variant of the Sidewinder is used as a SAM missile by the Army.
The committee recommends approval of the procurement requests for Sidewinder,
Sparrow, and Phoenix.
Research and development requests for fiscal year 1978 for air-to-air
missiles include $5.9 million for improvements to the -9L Sidewinder plus $5.9
million for a new dogfight missile to replace the Sidewinder; $18.9 million for ^ )
an Advanced Monopulse Seeker for the Sparrow, $6.4 million for the NATO Sea
Sparrow, plus $23.6 million for a new Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) to replace the Sparrow; $7.1 million for Phoenix improvements; and
$3.9 million for studies of a Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS)
program for the Navy which would include a new missile to replace the Sea Sparrow.
There also is general supporting technology effort for an Advanced Intercept
Missile (AIM) , which would replace the Phoenix and which could be used by both
the Air Force and Navy, although no specific program has been started yet. In
summary, there are product improvement efforts on the existing missiles and also
funding on replacement programs for all of the existing missiles.
Committee Considerations
The committee believes that the status of the present air-to-air missile
programs is quite encouraging.
The Sidewinder-9L is proving in operational tests to be a superior weapons
system. Both the Air Force and Navy are procuring this missile in common after
years of using different versions of the basic Sidewinder.
The Sparrow missile has known and much-publicized operational shortcomings
in its present-7F seeker, but competitive prototype tests of the new monopulse
seeker have been extremely favorable. The monopulse Sparrow promises to be a
superior missile for the 1980s time period. Both the Air Force and Navy will use
the monopulse Sparrow, which will retain commonality in their medium range
inventory.
The Phoenix has been extremely successful in operational trials to date




The committee is concerned that the proposed new development programs
could lead to a proliferation of different missile types in the 1980s, as con-
trasted to present use of 3 basic designs. Proliferation of air-to-ground weapons
has been a problem in the past and potentially it could occur with air-to-air
missiles.
The committee recommends that careful analyses of presently on-going
operational tests on dogfight missiles (called AIMVAL/ACEVAL) be completed to
determine if any new program is warranted or if the -9L should be further im-
proved. The committee deleted the $3.9 million requested for a new program as
being premature, and further insists that any new dogfight missile be used in
common by both the Air Force and Navy and be jointly funded.
The committee believes that the request to start AMRAAM prototypes this
year also is premature and deleted the $23.6 million requested. The implied
requirements for 2 new missiles to replace the Sparrow (AMRAAM and SIRCS) should
be re-evaluated during the coming year, as should the possibility of
combining
the AIM Intercept Missile into the Sparrow replacement. There is $5.0 million
carry-over available from fiscal year 1977 in the AMRAAM account that can be
used for this purpose, as well as the SIRCS funds approved by the committee.
The committee also recommends that the Department of Defense re-evaluate
the use of the present -9L Sidewinder fuse to see if lower cost fuses such as
the Army's DIDO might not be more cost-effective.
-> i -i

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
May 17, 1977
SHIPBOARD INTERMEDIATE RANGE COMBAT SYSTEM (SIRCS)
The Navy requested $3.9 million to continue development of the Shipboard
Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS) , an advanced shipboard close-in air
defense and fire control system for the early 1990' s. The House deleted all
of the authorization, expressing concern over the high development cost for
SIRCS which apparently would be funded at the expense of near and intermediate
term improvements to Navy fire control systems. The Senate added $13.0 million
to the budget request in a floor amendment, providing $3.0 million for the
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) commonality studies and $13.9
million for the SIRCS program contract efforts.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
June 20, 1977
Sec. 203. Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under Section 201
for the Navy (including the Marine Corps) for research, development, test, and
evaluation, an amount not to exceed $3,894,000 shall be available only for (1)
defining a set of design specifications for the Shipboard Intermediate Range
Combat System (SIRCS) program, and (2) conducting an open competition, to be
conducted after such design specifications have been defined and to be based
on such specifications, to select a contractor or contractors for the advanced
development phase of such program. In developing such design specifications,
the Secretary of the Navy shall include the best features of the designs devel-
oped by the three contractors which have been selected for the program before
the date of enactment of this Act and such other features as the Secretary
considers appropriate. A contract entered into under the competition required
by this section may be for development of the entire system or for development
of any independent subsection of the system.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
June 20, 1977
Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS)
—
The Navy requested $3.9 million to continue development of the Shipboard
Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS) , an advanced shipboard close-in air
defense and fire control system for the early 1990 's. The House deleted all of
the authorization, expressing concern over the high development cost for SIRCS
which apparently would be funded at the expense of near and intermediate term
improvements to Navy fire control systems. The Senate added $13.0 million to
the budget request in a floor amendment, providing $3.0 million for the Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) commonality studies and $13.9 million
for the SIRCS program contract efforts.
The SIRCS program has followed the acquisition strategy of the Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-109 and intends that two contractors be funded
to build competitive prototypes of a new radar and new missile integrated with a
fire-control computer system for shipboard use. The Navy presently is evaluat-
ing proposals submitted by three separate contractors for these components.
Under the program as presently structured the Navy could not select the most
desirable components from individual contractors but would have to fund continued
development of the complete systems of two of the three contractors. This acqui-
sition approach could cause continued development of less than optimum subsystems,
a factor which exposes a potential shortcoming of the development procedures of
OMB Circular A-109. Consequently the House conferees emphasize that the language
specified in Sec. 203 is a clear intent to exclude SIRCS from the A-109 process
and made the funding authorized contingent upon this condition.
The conferees agreed that the next step in the SIRCS program is for the Navy
to define a "baseline" design containing the best features contained in, but not
limited to, three funded contractors, and that the baseline SIRCS is to be submit-
ted for open competition for the advanced development phase. Under this procedure
the Navy has the flexibility to select or develop independent subsystems such as
the radar or missile for independent contracts if such action is determined to be
desirable and will provide the best possible weapons system.
The conferees agreed to provide $3.9 million for the SIRCS program, with the
understanding that the Navy uses the baseline approach to continue the program.
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95th Congress ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ( Report
1st Session J 1 No. 95-565
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1978
Auoubt 4, 1977.—Ordered to be printed
Mr. Mabon, from the committee of conference,
submitted the following
CONFERENCE REPORT
[To accompany HJL 7933J
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navt
Amendment No. 47: Reported in technical disagreement. The man-
agers on the part of the House "will offer a motion to recede and concur
in the Senate amendment with an amendment as follows
:
$3,991,791,000: Provided, That none of the funds appropri-
ated for the Shipboard Intermediate Range. Combat System
program shall be available unless expended in compliance
with existing acquisition policies and procedures prescribed
in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109
The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the
amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.
The $3,991,791,000 compares with $3,895,517,000 as proposed by the
House and $4,032,214,000 as proposed by the Senate.
The conference agreement on items in conference is as follows
:
Qthth Matters Related to Tina V
The Senate report emphasized that the Department of Defense
should adhere to OMB Circular A-109, and future funding of new
programs will be contingent on compliance. The House managers
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